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The Singapore government has responded quite positively to the development 
of low cost carriers (LCCs) in recent years by developing the airport infrastructure 
and adopting liberal traffic rights policies. It is anticipating a healthy growth of LCCs 
here; and there is an expectation that the potential benefits brought about by them will 
be significant. This study provides an analysis of the markets and networks of the 
LCCs in Singapore and the impacts they make on the local air transport landscape. 
This is done with comparative studies of other airports in the region, particularly those 
in Southeast Asia which also cater to the LCCs. In addition, this research aims to 
analyse the development of LCCs in Singapore and their potentials in increasing the 
connectedness and connectivity of Singapore with the region. The frequency of flights 
to the various destinations served by LCCs as well as the seat capacity (supply) of the 
flights are calculated and analysed. New routings developed by the LCCs which are 
previously not serviced by Full Service Carriers (FSCs) are also examined. The thesis 
also aims to explore whether the Singapore government’s large spending in promoting 
the LCC industry here is justified. Passengers’ opinions on the LCCs they prefer are 
looked at as this will indirectly indicate the type of LCC which will thrive well in 
Singapore. The Civil Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS) has devoted much 
efforts and resources to promoting the LCC industry at Changi. Through a critical 
review of the dynamics of the LCC industry and the nature of competition and trends 
in travel patterns in this region, the study will determine if the expected growth of 
LCC activities will materialise and what are the impacts we can expect from the 
development of LCCs.  
Keywords: Airports, Low cost carriers, Singapore, Southeast Asia, Far East Asia, 
Spatial analysis 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
1.1 Preamble 
For the last half a century, despite the rapid growth in demand for its services, 
the air transport industry has remained marginally profitable, possessing a rather low 
rate of return on the capital invested. In particular, airlines are the worst performing of 
any of the individual sectors in the entire air transport chain (Figure 1.1) (Doganis, 
2002: 5). Yet, many new airlines are sprouting over the last few years, and in 
particular, in the Far East and Southeast Asia region of the world. For example, 
between the years 2004 and 2008, there were thirteen new Low Cost Carriers (LCCs) 
emerging in Southeast Asia alone. 
 
Figure 1.1: The profitability of key players in the air transport chain: estimation of 
return on capital employed, 1992 – 1996. 
(Source: Spinetta, 2000, as cited in Doganis, 2002) 
 
There is no simple reason to explain the above apparent contradiction between 
the rapid growth in the number of airlines and the industry’s marginal profitability. In 




general, it could be due to an increase in propensity to travel as worldwide affluence 
is growing. The capability in economic terms is increasingly available as put forth by 
Shearman (1992: 4), and this has enabled more people to increasingly travel across 
and around the world. It is an inherent nature of man to have this curiosity and desire 
to see and understand other places and cultures and air transport gives people the 
opportunity to do so (ibid). In fact, air transport is arguably the only form of transport 
that is three-dimensional (Bamford & Robinson, 1978: 42) since aircraft are not tied 
to the surface and have the ability to fly over terrestrial obstacles which have been 
important dividers of societies over space and time. This has certainly helped to 
overcome the friction of distance, and providing added convenience and time savings 
over other forms of transport.  
In fact, over the last few decades, the air transport industry has increasingly 
been playing a vital role in facilitating economic growth. Aviation transports some 2 
billion passengers annually and 40% of interregional exports of goods (by value) 
(ATAG, 2008). In addition, 40% of international tourists now travel by air (ibid). In 
terms of worldwide passenger traffic, the growth has been tremendous: from 1.5 
billion in 1997 to over 2.1 billion in 2006 (Figure 1.2) (ICAO, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 1.2: Passengers carried on scheduled air services, 1997 – 2006  
(Source: ICAO website, 2007) 
 




Asia, being one of the economic regions which have achieved significant 
growth rates over the last decade since the 1997 financial crisis, is currently a hotbed 
for aviation activities. In particular, the densely populated region of Southeast Asia, 
with over 500 million people, has seen tremendous growth in the aviation sector and 
remains one of the most underserved aviation markets in the world with huge 
potential for further growth. However, it is not unique from any other aviation region 
in the world insofar as regulation of air services is concerned. The regulating 
mechanism has hindered the growth in the aviation sector in this region although we 
are seeing a gradually “opening up of the skies” in order to tap into this huge market 
that is seen as a booster to many of the countries’ economic and trade master plans. 
Without the deregulation of the aviation industry in the region, albeit a gradual and 
rather slow one, the air travel market would not have seen such tremendous growth 
over the last decade; and new entrants, most notably the low cost carriers (LCCs), 
would have found it difficult to enter the market and create the significant waves 
which many of them are now generating.  
In fact, the entry of LCCs into the regional aviation industry is a force to be 
reckoned with and a personal interest on the LCCs arose as the author wanted to 
understand and find out why the LCCs in this region have become a sector of the 
trade industry in which several regional governments have been actively promoting. 
The following section will explain the rise of the LCCs in other parts of the world as 
well as the development of the LCC market here in Far East and Southeast Asia. An 
attempt will be made in Section 1.3 of this chapter to understand the relationship 
between the growth of LCCs and geography as a discipline and why a geographical 
perspective is useful to understanding the impacts made by LCCs on Singapore and in 
the region. 




1.2 Low cost carriers and their development 
In order to understand the development of LCCs, it is important to understand 
what these carriers are and how they differ from a conventional Full Service Carrier 
(FSC). To show the contrast, the author will provide a simple classification table to 
illustrate what exactly a LCC is in terms of its characteristics and compare it with that 
of a FSC. Table 1.1 below is an adaptation from McKechnie et al.’s (2007) work on 
the potential in the growth of the LCC industry in the Middle East. 
 
Low Cost Carrier Full Service Carrier 
Simple brand – low-fare Complex brand – price + service 
Online and direct booking Mainly travel agents 
Simple ticket price structure and ticket-
less check-in 
Complex fare structures and tickets 
produced for each booking 
Use of secondary or low-charging 
airports (with exceptions) 
Focus on primary airports 
High aircraft utilization Lower utilization of aircraft 
Point-to-point service with no interlining Hub-and-spoke service with interlining as 
one of the key focus 
Simple product – additional services and 
facilities to be charged 
Complex integrated service product(s) 
Focus on ancillary revenue generation – 
e.g. onboard retailing and advertising 
Focus on primary product 
Mainly short-haul focus Short and long haul 
Common fleet type acquired at very good 
rates 
Mixed fleet 
Single class configuration Cabins are divided into two or three 
classes 
No complimentary in-flight meals Complimentary in-flight meals 
Only operate core activities. Outsource 
most operations 
Less outsourcing of operations 
 
Table 1.1: Comparison of the characteristics of Low Cost Carrier and Full Service 
Carrier 
(Source: McKechnie et al., 2007) 
 
From the table, we can see a distinction between the two types of carriers. For 
example, their pricing mechanism is different such that LCCs tend to have simpler 
fare structure and lowers fares as a result of the simple brand. Also, in terms of 




operations, FSCs tend to operate using a hub-and-spoke network as compared to 
point-to-point for LCCs. Cabin services differ too with the LCCs not offering frills 
such as in-flight meal service when compared with the FSCs. 
 
1.2.1 Low cost carrier development in North America 
As mentioned in the previous section, the rise of LCCs has largely got to do 
with the deregulation of the air transport industry. While the world’s first LCC, 
Southwest Airlines, had actually started before the United States (US) 1978 
Deregulation Act, it should be noted that without the deregulation, Southwest Airlines 
might not have been that well-placed to expand beyond Texas (Doganis, 2001) where 
it has been operating since it first started in 1971. The deregulation has helped, in one 
way or another, Southwest Airlines to grow from a relatively small Texan intra-state 
carrier into the fifth-largest US airline in 1999 in terms of domestic passengers. This 
steady growth over nearly thirty years was also accompanied by consistent 
profitability in every year of its operation (ibid).  
Southwest Airlines was not the only LCC to have benefited from the 
deregulation. The act itself has helped to spawn a number of the new LCCs eager to 
profit from the lucrative airline business which had been virtually closed to new 
entrants up to that point. These LCCs were highly innovative with no frills and cheap 
fares as their selling points (Shearman, 1992: 87).  
 
1.2.2 Low cost carrier development in Europe 
Over in Europe, the LCC phenomenon is a much more recent and 
revolutionary one. The LCC concept became established in Europe with the birth of 
Ryanair, an independent Irish airline (Dobruszkes, 2006), in 1995. This low cost 




revolution in Europe was made possible when the third European Union (EU) 
liberalization package began removing regulations over fares and route entry. Aside 
from Ryanair, this new found freedom also gave birth to several LCCs including 
Buzz, easyjet and Go (Francis et al., 2003: 267). 
In 2005, about 14% of available seat miles in Europe were provided by LCCs, 
with the two largest players, easyjet and Ryanair accounting for nearly 9%. These 
carriers have pursued simplicity, productivity, efficiency and high utilisation of assets 
to offer low fares to customers (O’Connell and Williams, 2005: 259). Some of these 
airlines are sustaining growth rates as high as 25% per annum and if the forecasts are 
to stay, it is expected that low cost traffic will constitute up to 33% of short haul 
traffic in Europe by the year 2010 (Campbell and Kingsley-Jones, 2002). 
 
1.2.3 Low cost carrier growth in Far East and Southeast Asia 
As illustrated above, LCCs have reshaped the competitive environment within 
liberalized markets and have made noteworthy impacts in the world’s domestic 
passenger markets, which were previously controlled by the FSCs (O’Connell and 
Williams, 2005: 259). In the Far East and Southeast Asia region, the successes of 
LCCs such as Southwest Airlines, Ryanair and Virgin Blue have inspired a fresh 
breed of LCC entrepreneurs and these newcomers’ ambitious plans and aggressive 
marketing are worth exploring and investigating (Hooper, 2005). 
Following rather late on the global trend, LCCs rapidly emerged across Asia 
after deregulation first started in the year 2000 (Lawton and Solomko, 2005: 355). 
Prior to deregulation, there was no significant LCC operating in this part of the world. 
The slow development of LCCs in this part of the world was attributed to the 
perception that the low cost model adopted in the US and Europe could not be 




replicated in Asia, because of the longer aircraft stage lengths, lack of secondary 
airports and regulatory restrictions preventing access to international markets 
(O’Connell and Williams, 2005: 260). Since then, carriers claiming to be modeled on 
leading American and European LCCs have emerged in different parts of the Far East 
and Southeast Asia region, most notably in Japan, Malaysia, Singapore, the 
Philippines and Thailand.  
While the low cost experience is a relatively new phenomenon here in this part 
of the world, with much of the necessary management experience brought in from 
outside the region, some respected industry analysts have gone as far as to say that the 
changes, that is the rise of LCCs, are revolutionary and mark the transition to a new 
phase of industry development. Indeed, the perceived threat from the rise of LCCs to 
one of the world’s leading carrier was acknowledged recently when Singapore’s 
Minister Mentor, Lee Kuan Yew, lectured Singapore Airlines (SIA) on the need to 
change its business model (Hooper, 2005: 335). 
 In Singapore, the air transport industry has undergone an upheaval here in the 
year 2004 and the main reason for this commotion has to do with the introduction of 
LCCs to the aviation sector. As aforementioned, the growth of such airlines has been 
at a torrential rate in other parts of the world over the last couple of decades and 
especially so in the last couple of years. In Singapore, the increase has been equally 
rapid. Within a short time-span of seven months in 2004, three locally-established 
LCCs started services to regional destinations. One Thailand-based LCC also 
inaugurated services to the island city-state in that same period. In short, it is 
impossible to ignore the presence of low cost carriers here. 
The Singapore government has responded quite positively to the development 
and growth of LCCs here. In fact, it designated a plot of land near the SIA Catering 




Centre for the building of a LCC terminal (thereafter named “Budget Terminal” when 
it was completed) soon after the LCCs started operations to and from Singapore. The 
budget terminal was opened in March 2006 eventually. Operating costs at the new 
terminal is lower than at Terminals 1 and 2. This is in line with the needs and 
operating models of LCCs. The budget terminal alone cost about US$30 million to 
build and the cost was paid entirely by the government. The Singapore government is 
anticipating a healthy growth of the LCC industry and the potential economic benefits 
brought about by them; thus explaining the huge amount spent to promote the 
expansion and use of such carriers.  
In the words of Mrs Lim Hwee Hua, then Minister of State for Finance and 
Transport:  
 
"With the arrival of low cost carriers, both Singapore and our regional 
neighbours can look forward to greater opportunities for travel. This is a 
huge, but not well tapped travel market … the potential multiplier effects 
on regional economies would be tremendous, and will bring about 
economic growth and social integration for the region” (Changi Airport 
website, 2004).  
 
1.3 Air transport, low cost carriers and Geography: The relationship 
Geography, as an academic discipline, has often been referred to as the study 
of changes in patterns and processes over space and across time. Transport in itself 
has provided an avenue for interaction to take place over space and across time. 
Initially, transport geography was concerned with the location of economic activities 
and the monetary costs of distance. Over time, transport geography has evolved and 
transport geographers became focused on the spatial organizations and patterns 
created by (and for the purposes of) movement of people and goods over space.  
Transport studies also examine the concepts of movement, flow and activity 
patterns. Transport nodes like airport terminals also occupy an important place in 
space and constitute the basis of a complex spatial system. These ideas are integral to 




the field of geography as they provide some measure of spatial interaction and areal 
association both between and within places (Ullman, 1954). Transport geographers 
were able to provide a different perspective vis-à-vis traditional economic and/or 
engineering approaches to transportation studies – in that they contribute by analysis 
the transport system spatial analysis at different scales, such as interactions between 
the different actors in a transport system both locally and the globally.  
In the entire transport system, air transport has played an important role in the 
globalisation of the world by breaking down the distance barrier and allowing fast and 
efficient transport between any two points on the globe, fuelling the growth of 
numerous service industries such as finance, insurance and real estate (commonly 
known as the FIRE industry) as well as tourism. The air transport system is also one 
that encompasses interrelationships among various economic, political, technological 
and socio-cultural elements and thus presents itself as an arena where geographers can 
contribute through synthesising the diverse and complex linkages eminent in this 
highly dynamic system (Ong, 1995). Since the essence of the geography as a 
discipline maintains a strong spatial element, the air transport system and in this 
dissertation – the rise and LCCs and their impacts on Singapore, provides an excellent 
opportunity for geographers to do a systematic analysis in that it involves an 
examination of the actors of the air transport system and the impacts they have made 
(or are involved in) across space and time. The air transport networks and routings, 
the business landscapes and the airports’ growth all involve the concept of space 








1.4 Aims, objectives and significance of study 
In the light of the rapid development of LCCs here in Singapore, it is 
interesting and timely to conduct a research to investigate the potential benefits these 
airlines can bring for Singapore as well as the impacts they make on the Singapore air 
transport landscape. A lot of the literature on LCCs has been written on the 
experiences of the West but few have focused on Asia, much less on Singapore and 
Southeast Asia. In relation to this point, there are therefore three main reasons for 
carrying out this research at this juncture: Firstly, all the three locally-based LCCs 
have been operating for a few years and hence there will be sufficient data to look into 
for a thorough analysis of their impacts on Singapore.  
Secondly, the Singapore Budget Terminal has started operations for two years 
and thus it will be useful to see how the terminal has aid the development of the LCC 
industry in Singapore. Docherty, Shaw and Gather (2004) have noted that 
governments around the world have adopted interventionist stances towards the full 
range of infrastructure and service provision activities. With regards to this provision 
of infrastructure, Banister and Berechman (2001) have questioned whether transport 
infrastructure promotes economic growth. It will therefore be timely and apt to 
explore whether the Singapore government’s spending on building the budget 
terminal, to facilitate the growth of the LCC industry, is justified. Goetz and Graham 
(2004) have made claims that air transport is a business dominated by opportunist 
response. Thus, it will also be of interest to see if the decision with the building of the 
terminal is indeed that of an opportunist response.  
Academic studies have begun to look into the relationship between the 
concepts of economies of scope and traffic density since the late 1980s (Levine, 
1987). In the airline industry, economies of scope are realised when an airline 




expands its route network and realises increasing benefits relative to costs (Goetz, 
2002). It is therefore no surprise that the low cost carriers here have been aggressively 
opening up new routes, and in particular to the usually less-travelled destinations, 
over the last year. The last reason is therefore to see whether these new routings are 
sustainable and whether they will help to increase the connectedness and more 
importantly, the connectivity of Singapore to the region. Connectedness refers the 
linkages between two city-pairs, that is, whether two city-pairs are linked up or 
otherwise; while connectivity refers to the frequency and volume of flights. For 
example, an airport may be well connected to many cities, but overall connectivity 
will still be low if flight frequencies are low (e.g. once or twice weekly). 
At the end of the research, it is anticipated that a synthesis of the benefits of 
investing in the promotion of LCCs in Singapore could be achieved. It is also 
endeavoured that a holistic overview, on the exploration of whether Singapore 
government’s large spending in promoting the LCC industry here is justified, could be 
provided. In our bid to create a conducive environment for our airline partners to 
make profits and enhancing Changi Airport's status as an aviation hub (Bowen, 2000), 
the Singapore government should be prudent in their efforts to develop the LCC 
industry here and it is endeavoured that this paper can shed some light on this issue. 
The aims and objectives, with a brief explanation of the methods used, are 
summarized as follow: 
1. To provide an analysis of the markets and networks of the LCCs in 
Singapore and the impacts they make on the local air transport landscape. This will be 
done with comparative studies of other airports in the region, particularly those in 
Southeast Asia which also caters to the LCCs. 
 




2. To analyse the development of LCCs in Singapore and their potentials in 
increasing the connectedness and connectivity of Singapore with the region. The 
frequency of flights to the various destinations served by the low cost carriers as well 
as the seat capacity (supply) of the flights will be calculated. New routings developed 
by the LCCs which are previously not serviced by FSCs will also be examined. 
  
3. To explore whether the Singapore government’s large spending in 
promoting the low cost carrier industry here is justified. Passengers’ opinions on the 
type of LCCs they prefer will be looked at as this will indirectly indicate the type of 
LCC which will thrive well in Singapore. Only when the type of LCC preferred by 
Singaporeans, as well as travellers in the region, is being promoted will the growth of 
the low cost carrier industry be successful. If the government wants to justify its large 
spending on promoting the growth of the low cost carriers in Singapore, it should look 
into the “most preferred” LCC which can help to boost the growth of the industry. 
 
1.5 Outline of thesis 
A rough outline of the thesis is as follows: 
In Chapter Two, a review on the literature on LCCs will be undertaken. This 
will highlight the works that have been done to date and will also serve to provide the 
conceptual underpinnings to this study. 
Chapter Three will provide a broad assessment of the rise of the LCC industry 
as well as give a detailed analysis on the deregulation of the airline industry as a trend 
that is catching up in the Far East and Southeast Asia region. Attention will be paid to 
air rights and conventions. The developmental experiences of the LCC industry in the 
different regions will be examined closely. 




Chapter Four will focus on the methodology used to source the data and 
information needed for a critical analysis of the study. It gives a structure on the 
primary and secondary fieldwork carried out, including the research design, data 
collection process and the limitations faced during fieldwork. A mix of empirical data 
collection as well as qualitative methodologies are employed to provide the balance 
required in present-day social science research. Methodologies used include mapping 
airline networks; analysis flight frequencies, schedule and networks; a physical 
examination of the airports concerned; and last but not least, a large-scale quantitative 
and qualitative survey. 
Chapter Five will present the findings of the research and provide an empirical 
examination of the current status of the LCC industry in Singapore as well as the 
surrounding region. The chapter will look specifically at the impacts made by the 
LCCs in Singapore over time, with comparison to selected regional cities to provide 
the scalar dimension.  
Chapter Six, which is the penultimate chapter, will present the case study 
findings. The results obtained from the case study will be analysed to better inform 
readers of the kind of LCC which is preferred by travellers in Singapore.   
The concluding chapter, Chapter Seven, will review and summarize the issues 
raised in this thesis as well as highlight the results and conclusions of this study. 















CHAPTER TWO: LITERATURE REVIEW AND STUDY FRAMEWORK 
 
2.1  Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature published on the topic of LCCs in transport 
geography and other related fields. The focus will be on the issues which have been 
dealt with by other researchers on the topic of LCC and what are the key strands of 
research done on LCCs. More importantly, the author will talk about the literature gap 
which aroused his interest and concern, leading to his decision to embark on this 
research.  
 
2.2  Academic writing on low cost carriers 
The issue on LCCs in the air transport industry has been studied by scholars 
from a wide-ranging number of disciplines, including economics, geography and 
history amongst others. The multi-disciplinary nature of the topic enables researchers 
to publish in a variety of journals that transcend these disciplines such as Journal of 
Air Transport Management, Journal of Transport Geography, Journal of 
Transportation, Journal of Transport Economics and Policy, Tourism Management as 
well as many others which are more discipline specific. 
 
2.2.1 Research on low cost carriers – understanding their key economics 
and operations 
 
A significant proportion of the literature on LCCs deals with the economic and 
operations aspects of these carriers; looking specifically into their costs, pricing, and 
scheduling analysis. The rise of Southwest Airlines in the US spawned a wave of 
works in economics that deal primarily with the operational pricing strategy of 
Southwest. For instance, Windle & Dressner (1995) looked at how Southwest has 
developed into the only major airline in the US to return profits regularly. Together 




with Vowles (2001), Windle & Dressner (1995) also examined how the airline has 
caused passenger numbers to rise and fares to fall on routes where it introduces new 
services. Doganis (2001) gave a detailed analysis on how the airline rose from a 
relatively small Texan intra-state carrier to the fifth largest US airline in terms of 
domestic passengers by the year 1999. 
 
2.2.2 Research on low cost carriers – understanding their relationships 
with the external environment they are operating in 
 
Calder (2002), Lawton (2002), and Sull (1999) have at various stages looked 
at how LCCs achieve savings through methods such as selling tickets directly (often 
electronically) to customers and therefore avoiding travel agents’ commissions. 
Interestingly, these authors also made up a second group of scholars who examines 
LCCs through a different strand of focus, that is, to look beyond the airlines’ own 
internal management and instead analyse their relationship with the external 
environment in which they operate in. They also looked at how the LCCs re-
engineered business models and processes and how they negotiate with airport 
authorities to bargain for airport charges to be lowered. Other authors who also look 
at LCC-airport interaction include Francis, Humphreys & Ison (2004) and Gillen & 
Lall (2004). Worthy of special mention is Forsyth’s (2007) article which provided a 
review on the conventional thinking of LCCs as saviours of secondary airports.  
Joining this group of scholars are those who looked at how LCCs grow with 
respect to the regulation of the industry as a whole. For example, Li (1998) examined 
how the tightly regulated ASEAN skies is not beneficial to the growth of LCCs. He 
also analysed how the ‘fifth freedom right’ is a common deadlock issue in the open 
skies negotiation in ASEAN and how this problem will affect the development of 




LCCs in this region. Dobruszkes (2006) did a similar assessment with a case study on 
the European LCCs. 
 
2.2.3 Research on low cost carriers – the need to understand beyond the 
“western model” 
 
The issue of LCC development has gained prominence amongst professional 
academics mainly in the western part of the world. Few have written on the growth of 
LCCs in the Southeast and Far East region. Of the few who have done research work 
in this part of the world, such as Hooper (2005) and O’Connell & Williams (2005), 
the focus has been on the LCCs’ business models and their access to the market, 
focusing on the competition LCCs have from the surface transport modes. This has 
therefore prompted the author to carry out this study to look at issues beyond this. 
There has been a consistent lack of research on the unique characteristics of 
the LCC industry in Southeast and Far East Asia. For example, secondary cities and 
airports are not favoured by LCCs in these two regions, which is not the case for 
LCCs in the west. Furthermore, few researches have highlighted the problem of poor 
intra-region connections by the LCCs in Southeast Asia especially, with the exception 
of Hooper but who has dealt this issue using a comparative analysis with surface 
transport modes aforementioned. There is no intention to provide solutions but rather 
to bring across to readers that such issues do exist in the LCC industry and that they 
do have impacts on the industry as a whole as well as on the Singapore air transport 
landscape in this context.  
Last but not least, while a number of the literature on air transport in general 
do talk about the concepts of connectedness and connectivity, none has look at how 
the two can differ for the LCC industry in Asia. Connectedness refers to how 
connected a place is to the rest of the places in a defined area. On the other hand, 




connectivity refers to the frequency and volume of the flights in the case of the air 
transport industry. Henceforth, a city can be very well-connected but its connectivity 
can be bad if for each of the connections there are very limited flights on a per period 
basis. The research on this area within the Asian LCC industry is clearly lacking, and 
it is hoped that my research will shed some light on this issue. 
 
2.3  Academic writing on air hubs, their Geography, and their relationship 
with low cost carriers 
 
 The bulk of the literature on LCCs have very much emphasized that these 
carriers’ operandi modus is to use a point-to-point system of flying as opposed to a 
hub-and-spoke system used by conventional full service carriers. While this is true in 
terms of the business operation of LCCs, it does not mean that hubbing has nothing to 
do with these airlines. In actual fact, LCCs have the potential to raise the hub status, 
otherwise known as the centrality and intermediacy of airports. Fleming and Hayuth 
(1994) have stressed the importance of these two concepts in their research on the 
spatial characteristics of transport hubs. The impact made by LCCs on airports’ hub 
status is best seen in the case of Singapore Changi Airport. As of 1 March 2007, 
LCCs in Singapore operate 566 weekly flights to 27 cities, which accounts for 14.6 
per cent of total passenger flights at Changi Airport compared to 10.5 per cent in 
April 2006 (Changi Airport website, 2007). 
Changi Airport has long been touted as one of the air hubs in the Southeast 
Asia region; and with LCCs making up 14.6 per cent of the total passenger flight - it 
goes to show the importance of LCCs to an air hub. It can be said that Changi 
Airport’s centrality and intermediacy are being boosted by the influx of LCCs into the 
country’s air transport landscape. In relation to this, there is a therefore a need to re-




look the relation of hubbing and LCCs, that is, to look beyond the operandi modus of 
the LCCs but to look at how LCCs help air hubs to grow. 
Similar to the literature on LCCs, a significant proportion of works in the 
literature on air hubs deal with the operation and economic aspects of air hubs, 
focusing on costs, pricing, and scheduling analysis. For example, Berechman and Shy 
(1998), and Schipper et al. (1998a) provided an analysis on spatial equilibriums and 
optimal networks. On the other hand, Spiller (1989) and Hendricks et al. (1995) 
describe how hubbing affect airport economics.  
The business and management aspects of air hubs have also been written 
extensively and issues covered include competition, the regulation mechanism, policy 
implications and business strategies, all in relation to hub-and-spoke network 
structures. Some of these works include Hansen (1990), Button & Lall (1999), Hanlon 
(1999), Shy (2001), Doganis (2002, 2006) and Gillen & Morrison (2005). 
There is no clear-cut or a precise definition of what an “air hub” is and it is 
lacking consensus at this moment. However, there have been attempts to provide 
some kind of an empirical definition to identify air hubs. There are a number of 
contributions dedicated to this issue, including O’Kelly (1986, 1992), Shaw (1993) 
and Button (2002, 2004). 
Of special mention here is Morton O’Kelly has written extensively on hub 
location theory and hub system analysis. As early as 1987, O’Kelly has already 
written on the problem of hub location. In fact, that piece of work attracted the 
attention of researchers from a wide variety of fields and since then, the hub location 
problem has become a widely-researched area (Bryan & O’Kelly, 1999:275).  
Bryan & O’Kelly (1999) provided a simple but clear definition to what exactly 
a hub is. In their words, “hubs serve as transshipment points and allow for the 




replacement of direct connections between all nodes with fewer, indirect 
connections”. In the field of air transport, hubs can help airlines to reduce costs by 
bundling flows and by concentrating equipment and sorting at specific locations 
(ibid). Figure 2.1 shows a point-to-point network and a hub-and-spoke network and it 
helps us to understand what a hub is and how it functions in the transport network.  
 
 
Figure 2.1: Point-to-point network (panel A) and hub-and-spoke network (panel B) 
(Source: Bryan & O’Kelly, 1999) 
 
 
In Figure 2.1 (Panel A), there are no intermediate stops for each flow of traffic 
and point of origin and destination are connected directly. This results in the lowest 
travel time but as seen in the figure, there is an extensive network of routes often 
which some are underutilized. A reduction in the total number of links, such as the 
use of hub-and-spoke network illustrated in Figure 2.1 (Panel B), will help to reduce 
costs significantly. Figure 1b shows a reduction in direct flows and link with the 
setting up of hubs or transshipment points. Although it increases individual travel 
miles, it results in lower total network costs (Bryan & O’Kelly, 1999:276). 
 
 




2.4 Understanding the regulation in the air transport sector and their impacts 
on the development of low cost carriers 
 
 Having looked at the basics of the LCC sector and the relationship between 
LCC development and air hubs, it is now prudent to understand the historical context 
which enabled such a phenomenon to arise. Therefore, we are now going to look at 
regulation and deregulation, two trends which are said to have impacted air transport 
today. 
 The literature in the 1960s and 1970s dealt a lot with the regulation-
liberalisation debate in air transport development (Wheatcroft, 1964; Levine, 1965; 
Kahn, 1970; Keeler, 1972; Douglas & Miller, 1974; and White, 1979). Regulation in 
the air transport industry actually started as early as 1918 although it gained 
prominence in the US only in 1938 with the Civil Aeronautics Act being formally 
established (Pickrell, 1991). The rest of the world only began seriously looking into 
the issue of regulating their air transport industry after the Second World War. By 
then, almost without exception, governments around the world perceived the need to 
exercise some degree of control over their air transport sector and this is achieved 
through regulation and of course if it is reduced, then we experience deregulation 
(Shearman, 1992). The specific reasons for exercising controls vary by country across 
the world but some obvious examples include safety standards, national pride, 
political ideology, and certainly to obtain trade advantages (ibid). 
The reason why aviation regulation gained prominence after the Second World 
War has largely got to do with the Chicago Convention held in 1944 amidst the war. 
The Chicago Convention in November 1944 was an important milestone in civil 
aviation. It was at this conference that the International Civil Aviation Organisation 
(ICAO) was formally established which marked the beginnings of a regulatory 
framework towards civil aviation. The document was signed on December 7, 1944 in 




Chicago, Illinois, by 52 signatory states. It received the requisite 26th ratification on 
March 5, 1947 and went into effect on April 4, 1947. ICAO came into being on 4 
April 1947. In October 1947, ICAO became a specialized agency of the United 
Nations linked to Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC). The convention has since 
been revised eight times (in 1959, 1963, 1969, 1975, 1980, 1997, 2000 and 2006). 
 It was at the conference that the sovereignty over airspace by individual states 
was legally recognized, providing a structure for bi- and multi-lateral negotiations and 
exchanges of air rights, also known as the “Freedoms of Air” which are privileges 
granted by states for the exemption of territorial rights mentioned in Articles One & 
Six of the convention. Articles One and Six of the 1944 Chicago convention assert 
that every state has exclusive rights of airspace over its territory and that special 
permission is needed for operating air services into the territory of foreign states. A 
multilateral agreement was only reached on the exchange of the first two freedoms of 
air (International Air Services Transit Agreement) which allow carriers to fly over 
foreign airspace and to stop on foreign soil for technical reasons. All other freedoms 
had to be bilaterally negotiated between states (Figures 2.2 and 2.3).  
 As such, states and their governments therefore play a central role in air 
transport. In the post-war period, there was the establishment and development of 
many national airlines around the world. Air transport was seen to be a mode of 
transport with very good potential; the historic benefits gained from dominance of the 
seas in commercial terms, by maritime nations such as the Netherlands and the United 
Kingdom (UK), suggested considerable opportunities for an air industry. However, at 
that stage, air transport was seen to be an “infant” industry which needed to be 
protected from the normal aggressive tactics of the market. Many governments saw 
their national carriers as very important entities and useful in flag-carrying terms. 




Consequently, government regulations were provided to nurture and protect the 
industry and this led to very limited competition and tight regulations in terms of 
pricing, seat capacity and market entry (Shearman, 1992). 
 FREEDOMS OF AIR 
First Freedom of the Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, 
granted by one State to another State or States to fly across its territory without landing (also known as 
a First Freedom Right). 
Second Freedom of the Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, 
granted by one State to another State or States to land in its territory for non-traffic purposes (also 
known as a Second Freedom Right). 
Third Freedom of The Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, 
granted by one State to another State to put down, in the territory of the first State, traffic coming from 
the home State of the carrier (also known as a Third Freedom Right). 
Fourth Freedom of The Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, 
granted by one State to another State to take on, in the territory of the first State, traffic destined for the 
home State of the carrier (also known as a Fourth Freedom Right). 
Fifth Freedom of The Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, 
granted by one State to another State to put down and to take on, in the territory of the first State, traffic 
coming from or destined to a third State (also known as a Fifth Freedom Right). 
ICAO characterizes all "freedoms" beyond the Fifth as "so-called" because only the first five "freedoms" have been officially 
recognized as such by international treaty. 
Sixth Freedom of The Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, of 
transporting, via the home State of the carrier, traffic moving between two other States (also known as 
a Sixth Freedom Right). The so-called Sixth Freedom of the Air, unlike the first five freedoms, is not 
incorporated as such into any widely recognized air service agreements such as the "Five Freedoms 
Agreement". 
Seventh Freedom of The Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, 
granted by one State to another State, of transporting traffic between the territory of the granting State 
and any third State with no requirement to include on such operation any point in the territory of the 
recipient State, i.e. the service need not connect to or be an extension of any service to/from the home 
State of the carrier. 
Eighth Freedom of The Air - the right or privilege, in respect of scheduled international air services, of 
transporting cabotage traffic between two points in the territory of the granting State on a service which 
originates or terminates in the home country of the foreign carrier or (in connection with the so-called 
Seventh Freedom of the Air) outside the territory of the granting State (also known as a Eighth 
Freedom Right or "consecutive cabotage"). 
Ninth Freedom of The Air - the right or privilege of transporting cabotage traffic of the granting State 
on a service performed entirely within the territory of the granting State (also known as a Ninth 
Freedom Right or "stand alone" cabotage). 
Figure 2.2: Freedoms of Air  
(Source: ICAO) 
 





Figure 2.3: Simplified schematic representation of the Freedoms of Air 
(Source: Shearman, 1992) 
 
 This protection given to the airlines by the governments has caused dire 
consequences in a number of countries. Government protection of flag carriers often 
produced artificial markets, in which “the profitability of individual airlines was 
determined more by the number of competitors allowed on particular routes than by 
the quality and pricing of their services” (Hanlon, 1996: 2). The conflict arises when 




governments are confronted with the dilemma of deciding to what extent state 
sovereignty should be compromised or surrendered in favour of industrial market 
forces. Also, as aforementioned, national pride is often a key reason for regulation as 
countries see the rise and demise of their national carriers as being symbolic of the 
country as a whole. Thus, many airlines have been artificially protected from 
competition which if exposed to they may find it difficult to continue their existence. 
 Moving on to the opposite of regulation, the classic and most widely cited case 
of deregulation in the airline industry is the case of the US civil aviation industry 
which was deregulated in 1978. Throughout its history, regulation of air services in 
the US sought to suppress competition. However, in an abrupt reversal of its own 
historical policies, the industry’s regulatory body took the first steps to relax its tight 
controls over service and fares in the mid-1970s. Emboldened by the results of this 
“deregulation experiment”, the US Congress codified these and even more sweeping 
reforms in the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978. According to some observers, this 
Act saw new travel opportunities, improved service and lower fares (Pickrell, 1991).  
 However, the ultimate success of deregulation hinged on whether the airline 
industry would become a competitive industry with large number of sellers rather than 
a monopolistic or oligopolistic industry. Thus, the argument in favour of deregulation 
rested on three key theoretical pillars concerning the organisation of the airline 
industry: (1) economies of scale were non-existant, (2) barriers to entry were 
insignificant, and (3) contestability theory could be applied to airline markets (Goetz, 
2002).  
 Generally, the US experience with the deregulation of its domestic air 
transportation system appears on balance to be quite successful (Pickrell, 1991). The 
European deregulation came much later in the 1990s and has been fairly successful 




due to a dilemma the grouping is facing, that is, whether a regulatory compromise 
aimed at achieving both greater competition and keeping Europe’s mega-carriers 
strong can be successful? 
 In this region and specifically the Association of South East Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), there have been talks on liberalising the aviation sector, including an 
ambitious plan for open skies policy. Open skies in ASEAN consist of liberalising the 
aviation routes between the member countries. It will include removal of capacity 
controls on routes, removal of entry barriers, and freeing up ownership arrangements. 
These can be expected to lead to efficiency gains in the ASEAN air transport industry, 
leading to net overall gains in economic welfare (Forsyth et al., 2006). 
 In short, open skies will provide fertile conditions within which LCCs can 
develop in the ASEAN region. LCCs have expanded consumer choices and improved 
the efficiencies of airline industries. They have forced regulators to change old rules 
of the game that tended to protect the full service carriers and their key markets. It is 
likely that an Open Sky environment in ASEAN that removes restrictions on 
designation, capacity and fares will support the growth of LCCs. On the other hand, 
the rise of LCCs will also exert pressure for the acceleration of the Open Sky policy in 
ASEAN (ibid). 
 . In reality however, the abstinence from action and indulgence in rhetoric is 
characteristic of the “ASEAN Way” and many hurdles lie ahead in the road for 
complete deregulation. As mentioned in The Straits Times on 21 November 2007, the 
barriers to services trade which will be expected to be freed up in 2010 is a promise. 








2.5  Chapter summary 
 To fully understand the LCC industry, some background and contextual 
knowledge of key developments and trends in aviation and air transport is required. 
This chapter is a modest attempt at providing part of this basic knowledge. Aside 
from providing a review of the research and literature available on the LCC industry, 
the author has also looked at the literature gap and how this research can contribute by 























CHAPTER THREE: THE DEVELOPMENT OF LOW COST CARRIERS IN 
ASIA 
 
3.1   Introduction 
This chapter seeks first to provide a brief overview of the developmental 
process of LCCs in Asia, with emphasis on Far East Asia, Southeast Asia, and in 
particular, Singapore. An overview of the overall economic landscape of Far East and 
Southeast Asia is presented to provide the background context to the development of 
air transport, and in particular the LCCs, in these two regions. Following which, there 
will be a brief discussion on the rise of LCCs in other parts of the world and how the 
Asian developmental process differs. An attempt is also made to provide a general 
assessment on the environment in which these carriers operate in. The discussion on 
LCCs in this region (i.e. Far East and Southeast Asia) will focus on such carriers 
based in Indonesia, Hong Kong, Macau, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand, and the 
focus of this thesis - Singapore. Likewise, the airports in these aforementioned 
countries will be discussed in respect to the growth of the LCCs. While the thesis will 
focus on the growth of LCCs in Singapore, an understanding of other LCCs and 
airports dedicated to LCCs will provide the comparative analysis component. 
The reasons for selecting these economies are not done without due 
considerations. Firstly, these are the economies which have been more pro-active in 
promoting the growth of LCCs. Pro-active here is defined as being encouraging 
towards the development of LCCs in which these economies have liberalise their 
aviation sector to accommodate such development. Some of these economies have 
seen a rapid increase in the number of LCCs being set up in their territories while 
some have been very welcoming towards LCCs based in other economies even when 
there are hardly any LCC start-ups in their own territories. 
 




3.2   Economic landscape of Far East and Southeast Asia 
With reference to the five countries in Southeast Asia and which are selected 
for this study, they had remarkable economic growth and development over the last 
three and a half decades prior to the Asian Financial Crisis which began in the second 
half of 1997. Except for the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand 
belonged to a group referred to by the World Bank as High Performing Asian 
Economies (HPAEs) (Daquila, 2005). The other countries which make up the HPAEs 
include Japan, Hong Kong, the Republic of China or Taiwan, and the Republic of 
Korea. 
These economies are characterised with a rapid increase in exports and foreign 
direct investments (FDI) as well as a change in the structure of exports away from 
primary products into manufactured goods. One important thing to note is that these 
economies have also achieved a higher level of social development in terms of 
improvement in the well-being of their population (ibid). Singapore, in particular, has 
seen a meteoric rise in its economic and social development over the last four decades 
since its independence from Malaysia in 1965. Economic growth and its relatively 
equitable distribution in the form of improved living standards, has assisted in the 
maintenance of political stability which has enhanced prospects for further growth 
(Australian Government Publishing Service, 1994). With an increasing disposable 
income, the populations living in these economies are able to afford air travel in the 
recent years and this increase in demand has inevitably helped to fuel the growth in 
the air transport sector of the region. However, despite the increase in demand from 
those who have seen an increase in their disposable income, many are still unable to 
travel on the FSCs which charge exorbitant fares from time to time especially during 
the peak travel seasons. Therefore, the LCCs can play an important role in affording 




this group of people to be able to fly instead of taking the more conventional road, rail 
or sea transport. In fact, this is indeed the aim of some of the LCCs, with Air Asia’s 
slogan being “Now Everyone Can Fly”. 
In terms of Far East Asia, the rise of the East Asian NIEs (Newly 
Industrialised Economies) in the postwar world economy, along with Japan’s 
remarkable ascent to the core, has been dubbed the “East Asian Miracle” (So and 
Chiu, 1995). Hong Kong, which is one of the economies used in this study, has seen a 
dramatic rise in its economic position in the Far East Asia region over the last few 
decades. Aside from being part of the “East Asian Miracle”, it has also been dubbed 
together with the Republic of China (Taiwan), the Republic of Korea, and Singapore 
as “The Four Asian Tigers”. Hong Kong’s economy is largely laissez-faire. This has 
translated down to developing the various sectors of the economy, including the 
transport sector where transport operators are largely not subsidised. Cathay Pacific, 
Hong Kong’s flag carrier, for example is not subsidized by the Hong Kong 
government. The state does not take a share in the majority of the companies either. It 
is therefore of no surprise that the LCC industry is not flourishing well in Hong Kong 
unlike in many of the Southeast Asian economies where the states have played their 
roles in varying degrees to help the LCCs in their operations. Macau, on the other 
hand, while being laissez-faire to some extent, has been very welcoming towards the 
LCCs and this shall be explained in greater detail in the subsequent parts of this 
research. 
 
3.3   Development of low cost carriers in Far East and Southeast Asia 
As mentioned in Chapter One, the successes of LCCs in Europe and the 
Americas have inspired a breed of LCC entrepreneurs in this part of the world and 




these newcomers’ ambitious plans are certainly generating a great deal of public 
interest (Hooper, 2005: 335). In order to understand the LCC landscape in the region 
better, it is important to look at when this LCC phenomenon first took place, the 
pioneers of Asian LCCs and what their motivations were.  
As mentioned by Hooper (2005), in Southeast Asia, the air transport industry 
went through several distinct stages of development from the 1940s till the present. 
First, there was a frenzy establishment of fledging national carriers during the 1940s 
as this was considered a priority then. Governments generally regard their national 
carriers as flag-carrying representations of national interest, one reason used to justify 
continued state protection of those airlines (Graham, 1995). By the early 1970s, 
airlines in the region began to break into the foray of international air travel and some 
of them managed to transform themselves into aggressive international players.  
However, with the transformation of Asian economies in the late 1970s and 
through to the 1980s, there was a rapid surge in intra-Asian air travel and national 
carriers in this part of the world began to feel that it was difficult to cope with the 
rising demands. This pressure actually helped in allowing the private sector to play a 
greater role in the air transport industry which had been dominated by state-run 
carriers all the while (Hooper, 2005). This can be said to be the “moment in time” 
which eventually helped in a way to trigger off the birth and growth of LCCs later in 
the 1990s. 
While allowing private airlines to start up is one of the reasons that trigger off 
the birth of LCCs, it was actually the opening up of the skies, simply put as 
deregulation, in Asia which helped to give rise to the development of such carriers. 
With Asian carriers’ traditional competitive edge stemming from lower labour costs 
diminishing quickly over the years, many governments realized that the long-




established protections enjoyed by the flag carriers under the restricted bilateral air 
services agreement (ASA) have to be removed, sooner or later (Li, 1998). 
As one of the fastest growing economic regions of the world, Asia is indeed a 
hotbed for aviation activities and therefore, the need to deregulate has become more 
pertinent than ever before. The region has recovered from the financial and economic 
turmoil of the 1997 crisis and is now on an accelerating path to development with 
trade being the key driver (Hooper, 2005).  
Southeast Asia boasts of a population of over 500 million, and this region has 
seen tremendous growth in the aviation sector and remains one of the most 
underserved aviation markets in the world with immense potential for further growth. 
In Southeast Asia, and specifically the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), the move towards Open Sky (as open skies is called in ASEAN) is 
embodied in a number of ASEAN declarations. In 1995, the ASEAN leaders adopted 
the Agenda for Greater Economic Integration in Bangkok which included the 
development of Open Sky Policy as an area of cooperation in the Plan of Action for 
Transport and Communications (1994-1996). Specifically, the Open Sky Policy called 
for the following:   (a) development of the liberalisation policy for air freight services; 
and (b) adoption of more liberal and flexible air services arrangements (Forsyth et al., 
2006: 143).  
The deregulation of the domestic markets paved way for the birth of LCCs 
which have also opened up new ASEAN routes. Cebu Pacific of the Philippines 
became the first LCC in Southeast Asia when it commenced operations in 1997, 
concentrating on domestic routes (Forsyth et al., 2006: 146). Air Asia of Malaysia 
was also restructured as an entrepreneurial LCC by its owners. Headed by an 
entrepreneurial personality who boasts that his airline has the lowest unit cost of any 




airline in the world, Air Asia has been particularly innovative in its approach to sales 
and distribution (Hooper, 2005). The airline’s ultimate aim is to create a pan-Asian 
LCC and it has been fairly successful in its attempt till date, which will be explained 
in the subsequent section on the individual LCCs in the region. In Singapore, the first 
LCC to set up its base here was Valuair, which differentiates itself from other low 
cost carriers in the west as well as those in the region in that it offers frills such as a 
baggage allowance of over 20 kg, in-flight food, allocated seats, and a seat pitch 
which is comparable to most FSCs out there – at 32 inches. The other two Singapore-
based LCCs, which were set up very quickly in response to Valuair’s entry into the 
LCC market, are Tiger Airways and Jetstar Asia Airways. Tiger’s operation strategy 
largely follows the model of America’s Southwest while Jetstar Asia takes on a more 
unique model, putting itself somewhere in between a FSC and a typical LCC model 
such as that of Southwest, although more aligned with the latter. These will be 
explained in greater detail in the subsequent section.  
In Far East Asia, Japan was the first to take the lead in deregulating its 
aviation sector. It all began as early as the 1970s with the old air transport regime 
collapsing in 1985 (Yamauchi, 2000). Japanese skies were deregulated in 1986 to 
allow for more competition. Further liberalization of the Japanese skies took place in 
the late 1990s and as a result, the first Japanese LCC, Skymark, was born. Skymark 
was explicitly modelled after the successful Southwest Airlines in the US. Soon after, 
Air Do was set up (Lawton and Solomko, 2005). Currently, there are six LCCs in 
Japan. As for Mainland China, with the aid of the country’s accession to the World 
Trade Organisation (WTO), Spring Airlines was set up in 2004 and is China’s first 
LCC. China United and Okay Airways followed soon after and the three airlines have 
remained as the country’s LCCs since then. Hong Kong and Macau, two Special 




Administrative Regions (SARs) of Mainland China also witnessed the birth of their 
own LCCs. Hong Kong’s LCC - Oasis Hong Kong Airlines operated its maiden flight 
in October 2005, while Macau’s Viva Macau also took to the skies in the same year. 
Both these LCCs differ from conventional LCCs in that their focuses are on the 
medium to long haul markets instead of the usual short to medium haul markets. 
Oasis Hong Kong Airlines, in particular, justified its focus on the long-haul sector by 
saying that flying long-haul helped to decrease maintenance and fuel costs. According 
to the airline, it also had a lower cost per passenger-kilometer compared to other 
airlines in Hong Kong. 
Of the Asian LCCs which have sprouted in recent years, some have failed 
while some survived and proved stronger than when they first started operations. 
Table 3.1 below shows the number of LCCs operating in Far East and Southeast Asia 
as of June 2008. While Vietnamese, Mainland Chinese, Japanese and Korean LCCs 
are listed in the table to give a holistic overview of the LCC industry in the region, 
they will not be taken into account or analysed in this thesis due to the reasons 














Region / Country Low cost carriers based in the stated country 
Far East Asia 





Skynet Asia Airways 
People’s Republic of China China United 
Okay Airways 
Spring Airlines 
People’s Republic of China – Hong 
Kong S.A.R. 
Oasis Hong Kong Airlines 
People’s Republic of China – Macau 
S.A.R. 
Viva Macau 






Indonesia Air Asia Indonesia 
Mandala Airlines 
PT Lion Mentari Airlines 
Wings Air 
Malaysia Air Asia (comprising Air Asia, Air Asia X and Fly Asian 
Express) 
Firefly 
Philippines Cebu Pacific Air 
Singapore Jetstar (comprising Jetstar Asia and Valuair) 
Tiger Airways 
Thailand Nok Air 
One-Two-Go 
Thai Air Asia 
Vietnam Jetstar Pacific Airlines 
Total Number of LCCs in Far East and Southeast Asia: 31 
 
Table 3.1: Low cost carriers operating in Far East and Southeast Asia as of June 2008 
(Source: compiled by author)  
 
In the following section, we will look at the different economies in Far East 
and Southeast Asia and their response to the development of the LCC industry in their 
territories. We will also examine some of the individual LCCs to better understand 
their operation dynamics. This is also to allow us to look more closely into their 
performance as well as their unique features.  
 




3.4 Background information on the individual low cost carriers in Far East 
and Southeast Asia 
 
3.4.1 Indonesia 
Indonesia is one of the economies which have seen a tremendous rise in the 
number of LCCs established there. Within the last five years, five LCCs were 
established in Indonesia, although one, Adam Air, has been forced to shut down by 
the government due to defaulting of payment for its fleet as well as poor safety 
regulations (Air Wise News, 17 March 2008; and Macau Daily Times, 18 March 
2008). The other four surviving LCCs include Indonesia Air Asia (Malaysia-based 
Air Asia is a major share-holder), Lion Air, Mandala Airlines (transformed from a 
FSC to a LCC) and Wings Air (subsidiary of Lion Air). 
Indonesia Air Asia is one of the more established LCC in Indonesia. Its 
performance has been strong with a year-on-year passenger growth of 15% between 
2006 and 2007 (Air Asia Annual Report, 2007). The airline was originally known as 
AWAIR International (AWAIR for short). On 1st December 2005, AWAIR 
International changed its name to Indonesia AirAsia after AA International Limited 
(AAIL), a company which 99.8% of its shares is owned by AirAsia, showed interest 
in acquiring AWAIR and started their discussion with AWAIR shareholders to 
acquire 49.0% shares in the company back in 2004 (Air Asia website, 2008). Lion Air 
first started flying in year 2000 and has braved through several crisis affecting air 
travel demand, including the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) episode 
and the Boxing Day Tsunami in which Indonesia was hard-hit. In 2005, it had the 
largest market share in Indonesia (Lion Air website, 2008) and on 27 April 2007, it 
became the first airline in the world to fly the newest Boeing aircraft, the B-737-
900ER (Plate 3.1). It also operates Wings Air, which started in 2003, primarily to 
serve domestic destinations within Indonesia. Amongst the Indonesian LCCs, 




Mandala Airlines is actually the oldest of them all, but for the bulk of its history, it 
operated as a FSC. It started operations as a FSC in 1969 but since October 2007, it 
has transformed to become a LCC. With air safety becoming a key issue in 
Indonesian aviation following the crash of an Adam Air aircraft (The Australian, 10 
January 2007) and one involving national carrier - Garuda Indonesia (The Daily 
Telegraph, 24 October 2007), Mandala Airlines has taken a great step forward by 
appointing Singapore Airlines Engineering Company (SIAEC) as its Airbus fleet 
maintenance provider (Mandala Airlines, 26 October 2007). 
 
 
Plate 3.1: A Lion Air Boeing 737-900ER berthed at Singapore Changi Airport 
(Source: Author) 
 
3.4.2 Hong Kong S.A.R. 
When compared to Indonesia, Hong Kong is not seen as a forerunner in the 
development of its own LCCs. Nevertheless, it has welcomed a number of regional 
LCCs. It actually had a LCC, Oasis Hong Kong Airlines Limited, but unfortunately at 
the time of writing this thesis, the carrier had ceased operations, with a provisional 
liquidator appointed to oversee the liquidation of the company (Reuters, 9 April 2008) 
(Figure 3.1).  
 





Figure 3.1: A notification excerpt from Oasis Hong Kong Airline’ website 
announcing its shutdown and liquidation 
(Source: Oasis Hong Kong Airlines website, dated 14 April 2008) 
 
 
Prior to its shutdown, the airline’s vision was “to open up the Far East as a 
destination by offering affordable long haul travel with no compromise on comfort, 
safety or service” according to its Chief Executive Officer Stephen Miller (Low Cost 
Airline Business, January 2007). Oasis Hong Kong Airlines differed from most other 
LCCs in the region by offering long haul travel instead of the usual short to medium 
haul services. According to its Commercial Director, Ken Chad, “The reason that we 
do this is because we get very high utilisation of the asset; we may not get it on day 
one because we’ve constrained our schedule when we only have two aircraft but as 
we increase the number of aircraft, we will naturally generate very high utilisation” 
(ibid). Although Miller had expressed that the model had resonated strongly with 
people in the UK (ibid), the airline eventually accumulated a loss of over HK$1 
billion (US$128 million) since its launch in October 2006, forcing its eventual 
shutdown (BBC News, 9 April 2008). Despite Oasis’ shutdown, a number of regional 
LCCs are keeping the LCC flying experience in place in Hong Kong and these 
include Air Asia, Cebu Pacific Air and Jetstar Asia Airways. 




3.4.3 Macau S.A.R. 
In the Far East Asia region, Macau is seen as one of the most pro-active in the 
promotion and development of the LCC aviation sector. In fact, at one point in time, 
Malaysian LCC - Air Asia’s chief Tony Fernandes had commented that Air Asia 
chose to fly into Macau instead of Hong Kong to serve the Pearl River Delta (PRD) 
region because of the high landing costs at Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA). 
He even warned that HKIA “risks losing out to rival hubs unless it sheds its ‘arrogant’ 
attitude and welcomes low-cost airlines like his” (Associated Press, 08 November 
2005). Although Air Asia did eventually fly into Hong Kong, it shuttles more 
frequently between Macau and Kuala Lumpur than between Hong Kong and the 
Kuala Lumpur, on a daily basis.  
Aside from being favoured by Air Asia, Macau is also a focus city for Tiger 
Airways of Singapore. In late July 2005, it was announced that the airline would 
commence flights from Macau to Manila (Clark) on 30 October 2005, a much-
heralded move as it signalled the establishment of a secondary base besides 
Singapore, allowing the airline to expand and diversify risks. 
Macau itself has a LCC, named Viva Macau. The airline covers both regional 
and long-haul routes and focuses on providing a network of air services from its home 
base, Macau, and the Pearl River Delta of Southern China. It had won the “New 
Airline of The Year” award at the Aviation Awards for Excellence Gala Dinner 
Ceremony held in Singapore on 31 October 2007. This award ceremony was 
organized by Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation (CAPA), the region's pre-eminent 
aviation strategists (Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation, 2007). 
 










Malaysia is home to the region’s arguably most successful LCC, Air Asia. In 
fact, Air Asia is said to have pioneered the low fare aviation industry in this region 
(The New York Times, 23 December 2007) although Cebu Pacific is actually the first 
LCC to have started operation. From the beginning, Tony Fernandes’ vision was to 
create a new aviation product in Malaysia, to revolutionise air travel and develop the 
local aviation market by offering low fares through stripping out costs (Low Cost 
Airline Business, July 2006). Today, Air Asia is the largest LCC operator in the 
region. As Fernandes mentioned, “Our growth from two to fifty planes is a testament 
that we have a winning product – low fares and quality flying experience”. (Low-Fare 
and Regional Airlines, Jan/Feb 2007). Aside from pioneering low fare travel in the 
region, the carrier also has many “first” to its accolade, including the first LCC in 
Asia to offer a web-integrated travel protection sales platform when it partnered AIG 
Southeast Asia to sell travel insurance aside from air tickets on its website (Regional 
Airline World, 2006). Catching up on its successful short to medium haul low cost 
operation, the carrier has also ventured into long haul low cost operation with the 




setting up of Air Asia X. Air Asia X franchises the brand name of Air Asia, which 
uses a common ticketing website, livery, uniforms, and management style with Air 
Asia (The Star, 6 January 2007). 
 
 
Plate 3.3: The author and other passengers disembarking from an Air Asia Airbus 




3.4.5 Philippines  
Aside from Air Asia, another much-touted LCC in the region is Cebu Pacific. 
Cebu Pacific is based in Pasay City, Manila, the Philippines. It is one of the 
Philippines' national flag carriers, offering scheduled flights to both domestic and 
international destinations. Domestic operations started in 1996 while international 
sectors were added in 2001. The airline is currently the country's leading domestic 
carrier, servicing the most domestic destinations with the largest number flights and 
routes, and equipped with the youngest fleet. Its average fleet age is 1.8 years old, 
making it the LCC with the youngest fleet in the region (Airfleets, 2008). According 
to the May 2008 issue of Airline Business, the airline is also ranked first amongst 30 
largest LCCs in the year 2007 in terms of revenue passengers per kilometre growth 











The conversion of Thailand's aviation sector from a controlled and regulated 
market to a deregulated free-for-all, have pleased consumers by driving down fares 
(Thailand Tourism Review, 2005). Thailand used to have the minimum airfare 
regulation and this rule was established to prevent undercutting of fares in the local 
market, with the probable intention of safeguarding the national carrier, Thai Airways 
(O’Connell and Williams, 2005). However, with the removal of such a ruling by the 
Thai government in 2003, LCCs were able to gain a foothold in the lucrative aviation 
market in the kingdom. The first LCC to be established in the kingdom was Thai Air 
Asia, which is a joint venture between Air Asia and Shin Corporation Plc of Thailand. 
Thai AirAsia launched domestic operations in February 2004. International 
destinations were added shortly after. The growth of the airline has been stable as it 




registered a year-on-year passenger growth of 19% between 2006 and 2007, as well as 
an average load factor of 75% for the year 2007 (Air Asia Annual Report, 2007). 
With the entrance of Thai Air Asia, Thailand’s skies quickly became a 
competitive battleground. The national carrier, Thai Airways, was prompted to form 
its own LCC venture, Nok Air. In essence, the flag carrier did not want new players to 
cherry-pick traffic from its own backyard (Regional Airline World, November 2005). 
According to its CEO Patee Sarasin, the carrier has been performing above its 
forecasts and that has given the airline the confidence to operate it wants to (Low Cost 
Airline Business, January 2007). In terms of developing markets, Sarasin also believes 
that many towns in Thailand can support a service, even those which the national 
carrier has dropped. He has also expressed interests in venturing beyond Thailand, to 
places such as Macau, Dhaka and Luang Prabang (Regional Airline World, November 
2005).  
Orient Thai Airlines, an international charter airline based in Bangkok, also 
started a LCC subsidiary known as One-Two-Go. One-Two-Go provides discounts 
for passengers who do not require a booking and who buy their seats at the airport on 
a first-come, first-served basis. An interesting point to note is that the airline uses 
Boeing 757s as well as McDonnell Douglas MD82s for its operations, as compared to 
the usual Airbus A320s or Boeing 737s used by most other LCC competitors. 
Furthermore, its fleet is supplemented by Boeing 747-200s drawn from its parent 
company’s fleet (Hooper, 2005).  
 





Plate 3.5: A McDonnell Douglas MD82 aircraft belonging to One-Two-Go on the 




While Singapore has a small population base and negligible domestic air 
travel, the country’s high per-capita incomes make her citizens a large source for 
inter-ASEAN travel (Forsyth et al., 2006). With the opening up of ASEAN skies, 
LCCs have been set up rapidly to capitalise on the huge potential of this inter-ASEAN 
travel market. Three Singapore-based LCCs were set up within a span of one year in 
2004.  
Former senior executives of Singapore Airlines began a plan to establish a 
new airline to emerge in mid-2003. The new venture, Valuair, operated its first 
scheduled flight from Singapore to Bangkok on 5 May 2004, shortly after Thai Air 
Asia introduced the same routing (Hooper, 2005). The company’s business model is 
different from that of Air Asia and typical LCCs in the west, in that it believes in the 
notion that customers do expect some basic levels of comfort and service. The airline 




does not pride itself on extreme low costs but instead on the level of service it can 
offer despite not being a full service airline. It aimed to cater to the entrepreneurs of 
small and medium-size companies (SMEs) who want to have some basic frills but 
who are not willing to pay the cost on full service carriers (Asia Times Online, 2004). 
The airline has since been bought up by Jetstar Asia’s parent company Jetstar and its 
name is currently retained to serve the Indonesian market as Indonesia refuses to give 
Jetstar Asia the required landing rights for lucrative markets such as Jakarta, Surabaya 
and Denpasar. 
Just as the former senior executives were toying with the idea of starting a 
LCC, Singapore Airlines also announced its plan to start a LCC, which was later 
named Tiger Airways. Eight months after the idea was announced, Tiger Airways also 
started its maiden voyage to Bangkok in August 2005. This immediately pitted it 
against the incumbent LCCs flying the same sector, that is, Thai Air Asia and Valuair. 
The airline has multiple fare tiers and a no-frills service with no meals and no seat 
allocations (Tiger Airways website, 2006), similar to the model operated by Air Asia. 
The airline aims to be the lowest cost carrier in Southeast Asia and claims to have a 
business plan that will see it dominate the region (Hooper, 2005). In November 2006, 
the airline has even won the Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation ‘Low Cost Airline of the 
Year’ award (Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation website, 2006). 
Capitalising on the increasing liberal Southeast Asia air transport market, 
Qantas Airways added to the competition based in Singapore when it announced in 
April 2004 that it had become the largest shareholder in a joint venture to operate a 
LCC, Jetstar Asia. As for the business model it is using, Jetstar Asia is using one that 
is in between the ultimate low cost strategy utilized by Air Asia and Tiger Airways 
and the basic frills strategy used by Valuair. Jetstar Asia does provide basic frills like 




allocated seating but it does not provide in-flight meals nor a wider seat pitch like 
what Valuair had offered. 
 
 
Plate 3.6:  Passengers boarding a Tiger Airways Airbus A320 berthed at the Budget 




 The Singapore-based LCCs have so far been doing well both economically as 
well as capturing the market-share, with Tiger Airways reporting a profit of S$37.8 
million in the year ending 31 March 2008 (The Straits Times, 7 August 2008). Jetstar 
Asia has also reported a 20% increase in revenue, a 4% rise in passenger load factor 
and 20% jump in passenger carriage for the same fiscal year (Jetstar Asia Airways 
website, 2008). 
 
 3.4.8 Section summary 
We have looked at how the various economies responded to the growth and 
development of LCCs in their respective territories. We have also studied some of 
these individual LCCs and examined their unique features as well as their successes 
or failures. An interesting take-away from the above analysis is that while the 




majority of the LCCs in Far East and Southeast Asia do follow the business models of 
their counterparts in the west, there are some who want to be unique and have 
marketed themselves differently from the rest. Valuair from Singapore, for example, 
wanted to focus on the SMEs as their main customer base. This resulted in the airline 
providing frills not normally associated with typical LCCs. Oasis Hong Kong 
Airlines, on the other hand, chose to shift its attention to the long haul market. Both 
airlines have however been relatively unsuccessful in their search for their position in 
the LCC industry with Oasis Hong Kong Airlines having to close down in early 2008. 
These incidents seem to hint that the “traditional” LCC business models seem to be 
more effective in order for the LCCs to stay competitive. I will discuss the issue of 
“most preferred LCC business model” in Chapter Six of this thesis.  
 In the next section of the chapter, we will look at some of the airports in the 
region and their responses to the growth and development of LCCs. An understanding 
of the airports’ responses will help us better understand the airport-airline relationship 
in the LCC market. 
 
 
3.5  Background information on selected airports in the region and their 
relationship with the low cost carriers 
 
3.5.1 Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, Jakarta, Indonesia 
Indonesia’s primary airport in its capital city of Jakarta is the Soekarno-Hatta 
International Airport. Located about 20 km west of Jakarta, in Tangerang Regency, 
Banten, Soekarno-Hatta began to operate in 1985, replacing the former Kemayoran 
Airport (domestic flights) in Central Jakarta, and Halim Perdanakusuma International 
Airport in East Jakarta. The land area of the airport is 18 km². It has two independent 
parallel runways separated 2,400 m connected by two cross taxiways. Soekarno-Hatta 
International Airport has two main terminals separated into three sub-terminals each, 




150 check-in counters, 30 baggage carousels and 42 gates. Each sub-terminal has 25 
check-in counters, 5 baggage carrousels and 7 gates. 
Angkasa Pura II, the airport’s operator, is currently planning to build a new 
terminal with modern design features. Terminal 3 is being built for LCCs, and already 
serves hajj flights and transnational migrant laborers. There is a master plan to make 
five passenger terminals, 1 hajj terminal and 4 runways. In 2009 the airport will be 
connected to Manggarai Station (future Jakarta central station) by a railway (PT 
Angkasa Pura, 2008). 
A look at the passenger and aircraft movements at the airport shows that the 
increases in both figures have been very substantial over the last five years (Table 
3.2). This trend has somewhat mirrored the growth in LCC in Indonesia and the 
region. The increases were especially pronounced between the years 2002 and 2004 
and this happened to be the same period which a sharp rise in the development of new 






2001 11,818,047 123,540 
2002 14,830,994 144,765 
2003 19,702,902 186,695 
2004 26,083,267 233,501 
2005 27,947,482 241,846 
2006 30,863,806 250,303 
 
Table 3.2: Passenger and Aircraft movements at Soekarno-Hatta International Airport, 
Jakarta, Indonesia 
(Source: PT Angkasa-Pura website, 2008) 
 




3.5.2 Hong Kong International Airport, Hong Kong S.A.R. 
Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA) is the main airport in Hong Kong. It 
is also colloquially known as Chek Lap Kok Airport, due to the fact that it was built 
on the island of Chek Lap Kok by land reclamation, and also to distinguish it from the 
old Hong Kong Airport, otherwise known as Kai Tak. The airport opened for 
commercial operations in 1998, replacing Kai Tak Airport, and is an important 
regional trans-shipment centre, passenger hub and gateway for destinations in China, 
East Asia and Southeast Asia. HKIA operates twenty four hours a day, and is one of 
the world's busiest airports in terms of international passenger and cargo movement.  
Opened on 6 July 1998, a week later than Kuala Lumpur International Airport 
(KLIA), it took six years and US $20 billion to build. On 28 February 2007, a second 
terminal (with check-in facility only) of the airport was opened. The terminal also 
features a new shopping mall named ‘Sky Plaza’ which provides a large variety of 
shops and restaurants together with a few entertainment facilities. The airport is 
operated by the Airport Authority Hong Kong (HKAA), a statutory body wholly 
owned by the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region. The airport 
was the third busiest airport for passenger traffic in Asia in 2005. In 2007, HKIA 
handled 47 million passengers and 3.7 million tonnes of cargo (HKIA, 2008).In terms 
of international traffic, the airport is the third busiest for passenger traffic and the 
busiest for cargo since its operation in 1998. There are 87 international airlines 
providing about 760 scheduled passenger and all-cargo flights each day between 
Hong Kong and some 154 destinations worldwide (HKIA, 2008). 
As mentioned earlier, Hong Kong is not as enthusiastic as the rest of the 
economies in the region in terms of promoting the growth of LCCs. In 2004, Air 




Asia's discussions to gain an entry into Hong Kong ended abruptly. Its talks with 
HKAA resumed in July 2005 but ended in a deadlock once again.  
When interviewed, Fernandes said: “I don’t think they’re serious. They’re not 
doing anything, they’re not trying to understand what we want”, adding that HKIA’s 
demands ground handling service fees that are “many, many more times'” what Air 
Asia paid in Macau. The HKAA, responding to Fernandes’ comments denied that it 
discriminated against budget airlines, stressing that its airport charges were 
“transparent and equitable to all”. The authority said in a statement that seven carriers 
that operate low fare flights use the Hong Kong airport, at that point in time when 
Fernandes made his statement. It also added that it would continue to work with all 
potential business partners, whether they are FSCs or LCCs (Associated Press, 11 
August 2005). 
HKAA went on to successfully engage Air Asia with the airline announcing in 
September 2007 that it plans to start flights to the former British colony. According to 
Fernandes, “We are applying to fly to Hong Kong now. I have been against Hong 
Kong all this time, but it has reached a point now where I’ve got a deal out of Hong 
Kong with its new Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and we want to build our low-cost 
terminal hub”. AirAsia’s change of heart to fly to Hong Kong followed the change in 
leadership at HKIA, when Stanley Hui Hon-Chung was appointed as the airport’s new 
CEO effective 1 Feb 2007. Fernandes added that Hong Kong’s Transport Ministry is 
very supportive of Air Asia going in. HKIA has offered the airline an attractive deal 
and more importantly, Air Asia needs Hong Kong to complement AirAsia X’s routes. 
The maiden flight to Hong Kong from Kuala Lumpur eventually took off on 15 May 
2008 (Air Asia website, 2008). 





Plate 3.7: Passengers taking outbound flights on LCCs queuing up for boarding of 




3.5.3 Macau International Airport, Macau S.A.R. 
Macau International Airport, situated at the eastern end of Taipa Island and 
neighbouring waters, is the only airport in Macau, which opened for commercial 
operations in November 1995, during Portuguese rule. Before then, the territory only 
had two temporary airports for small airplanes, in addition to several permanent 
heliports. Since then the airport has been a common transfer point for people traveling 
between mainland China and Taiwan, as well as a passenger hub for destinations in 
China and Southeast Asia. During 2006, the airport handled 5 million passengers and 
220,000 tonnes of cargo. The airport's designed capacity is 6,000,000 passengers per 
year, with processing capacity of up to 2,000 passengers per hour. The airport does 
not have a night curfew. There are 24 parking spaces for aircraft in the apron, with 4 
jetways. 
Macau is one of the economies which have been actively promoting the use of 
its international airport by the LCCs. It caters to one of the highest number of LCCs 




operating in the region. Major LCC tenants include Air Asia, Cebu Pacific, Jetstar 
Asia Airways, and Tiger Airways. Despite its liberal air rights, Macau is facing very 
stiff competition from nearby airports including Zhuhai Airport, which HKIA has a 
majority share in it. According to Dr. Zhou Yong, a researcher with the Macau 
University of Science of Technology, “it is not an easy task for Macau to become a 
LCC hub in the Pearl River Delta region given the number of airports operating there 
(five in total)”. Nevertheless, LCCs have showed signs of support for the airport. 
Tiger Airways, for instance, has built a secondary hub in Macau, offering flights 
between Macau and Clark in the Philippines and taking full advantage of the liberal 
air services agreement (Tiger Airways website, 2008). 
 
3.5.4 Kuala Lumpur International Airport, Malaysia 
Rapid economic growth in the 1980s rendered the then Kuala Lumpur 
International Airport (KLIA), Subang, inadequate and a decision was taken in July 
1991 to construct a new KLIA at Sepang. The new location, over 70 km from Kuala 
Lumpur, was viewed as inconvenient; the price tag, and its ballooning from original 
estimates, was steep; and critics alleged that, contrary to the government's assertions, 
Subang could still be expanded. Indeed, work on Subang continued simultaneously 
with KLIA's construction. Subang's new Terminal 3 was opened in December 1993 
and Terminal 2 was refurbished in 1995, only three years before the new KLIA's 
opening. 
Nevertheless, KLIA serves the Klang Valley Metropolitan Region, Greater 
Klang Valley, Shah Alam, Malacca, Selangor and South Perak. With the large 
catchment area, the airport quickly became one of the key economic strength for the 
nation, where it is well connected expressways to all parts of Peninsular Malaysia, 




some of the highly industralised areas like Shah Alam and the information and 
communications technology hub, Multimedia Super Corridor. It is one of the 
important components in the economy of Malaysia as the airport is the main import-
export center for the country. 
KLIA is capable of handling 35 million passengers and 1.2 million tonnes of 
cargo a year in its current phase. It is currently ranked as the 13th busiest airport in the 
world by international passenger traffic in 2007, and is one of Asia's busiest airport 
where it has handled 26,938,970 passengers in the year of 2007, a 13.0% increase 
over 2005 fiscal year (ACI Asia Pacific, 2007).  
The first purpose-built Low Cost Carrier Terminal (LCCT) was specifically 
built at KLIA to cater to the growing passengers of the LCCs, especially the 
passengers of Malaysia's own Air Asia. Construction of the LCCT was on a fast-track 
basis beginning in June 2005 at an approximate cost of RM 108 million (KLIA, 
2008). The 35,290 square-meter terminal is designed and built to suit the LCC 
business model that requires only basic terminal amenities. It cuts back on amenities 
such as aerobridges, elaborate physical structures and decorations in the passenger 
terminal building so as to offer lower landing fees, handling fees and airport taxes. 
This airport was the first airport in the world to have separation between normal 
carriers and low cost carrier. 





Plate 3.8: Passengers waiting for their flight inside the departure hall of the Low Cost 




3.5.5 Diosdadol Macapagal International Airport, Philippines 
Diosdado Macapagal International Airport (DMIA), otherwise known as Clark 
International Airport, is the main airport serving the immediate vicinity of the Clark 
Special Economic Zone (CSEZ) and the general area of Angeles City in the 
Philippines. It is located on an area of the CSEZ formerly used as the airfield of the 
Clark Air Base, which was closed in 1991 by the U.S. Air Force after the explosion of 
Mount Pinatubo, subsequently cleaned and reopened as the CSEZ. The airport is 
being planned and developed to be the premier gateway airport of the Philippines 
replacing Ninoy Aquino International Airport by year 2010 (Manila Standard Today, 
21 February 2008). 
The DMIA passenger terminal is being expanded and upgraded due to the 
growing demand in the airline industry. The new passenger terminal will increase its 
capacity to two million passengers annually and it is expected to be finished next 




month. The existing terminal can accommodate only 500,000 passengers per year 
(ibid). In its initial phase of development, its main tenants are the LCCs from around 
the region, including Philippines’ own LCC, Cebu Pacific. The LCCs have actually 
helped fuelled the growth of DMIA with passenger movements doubling within a year 




Plate 3.9: An Air Asia Airbus A320 berthed at Diosdado Macapagal International 




3.5.6 Suvarnabhumi Airport, Bangkok, Thailand; and Don Mueang 
Airport, Bangkok, Thailand 
 
Suvarnabhumi Airport is the international airport serving Bangkok, Thailand. 
After numerous delays and more than three decades of planning, the airport opened 
for limited domestic flight service on 15 September 2006, and opened for all domestic 
and international commercial flights on 28 September 2006. The airport is located in 




Racha Thewa in Bang Phli district, Samut Prakan Province, about 25 km east of 
downtown Bangkok. The airport has since become a key economic strength for the 
nation, as a modern motorway connects the airport, Bangkok, and the heavily 
industrial Eastern Seaboard of Thailand, where most of the export oriented 
manufacturing takes place. 
On 15 September 2006, the airport started limited daily operations. 
Coincidentally, the first airline to ply regularly service to and from Suvarnabhumi is a 
LCC - Jetstar Asia Airways (USA Today, 15 September 2006). Eventually, 
Suvarnabhumi officially opened at 3:00am on 28 September 2008, taking over all 
flights from Don Mueang, the ex-international airport having served Bangkok for over 
eight decades!  
Many difficulties were recorded on the first few days of the airport’s 
operation. On the first day alone, sluggish luggage claims were rampant. Also, many 
flights were delayed with Thai Airways claiming that 17 of 19 flights were delayed 
that day, and there were also failures with the check-in system (The Nation, 29 
September 2006). Subsequent problems included the failure of the cargo computer 
system, and the departure boards displaying the wrong information, resulting in 
confused passengers, especially as unlike Don Mueang, there were no "final calls" 
broadcasted (The Nation, 2 October 2006). Reports on a problem with the tarmac also 
surfaced shortly after the opening of the airport. The Engineering Institute of Thailand 
conducted investigations at the airport in late 2006 after signs of distress were spotted 
at several locations in Suvarnabhumi's taxiways and taxilanes. Multiple defects were 
found and eventually, the Thai government had to reopen Don Mueang while 
repairing works took place. Don Mueang has since reopened in January 2007, 
accommodating most of the domestic flights, except those operated by Thai Air Asia 




and selected ones operated by Thai Airways. Thai Air Asia had refused to shift back 
to Don Mueang unless it can shift both international and domestic services together, 
which the Airport Authority of Thailand (AOT) would not accede to (The Nation, 31 
January 2007). 
Currently, all foreign LCCs fly into Suvarnabhumi as international flights are 
not allowed to land at Don Mueang. As for the two domestic LCCs, only Thai Air 




Plate 3.10: A Thai Air Asia Boeing 737 berthed at a remote gate at Suvarnabhumi 




3.5.7 Changi Airport, Singapore 
Singapore Changi Airport was opened for operation on the 1 July 1981 and its 
official opening ceremony took place on 29 December of the same year. In its first 
year of service, Changi Airport handled 8.1 million passenger movements, more than 
200,000 tonnes of cargo and approximately 63,100 aircraft movements (Singapore 




Changi Airport website, 2008). The airport is operated by the Civil Aviation 
Authority of Singapore (CAAS) and is the home base of Singapore Airlines, 
Singapore Airlines Cargo, SilkAir, Tiger Airways, Jetstar Asia Airways, Valuair, and 
Jett8 Airlines Cargo. As of April 2008, there are about 4,340 weekly flights operated 
by 80 airlines to over 188 cities in 59 countries. An important contributor to the 
Singapore economy, 13,000 people is employed at the airport. The airport accounts 
for over S$4.5 billion in output. Since its opening in 1981, the airport has made its 
mark in the aviation industry as a benchmark for service excellence, winning over 280 
awards in a 20-year period from 1987 to 2007 (Singapore Changi Airport website, 
2008). Changi Airport's efforts to counter the onset of age include periodic physical 
upgrades to its existing terminals, building of new facilities and taking steps to 
provide a high level of customer service (Skytrax website, 2008). 
Changi Airport was the second in Asia, after Kuala Lumpur International 
Airport, to open a dedicated terminal catering to the budget traveller. The name of the 
Budget Terminal was decided as a result of a naming contest open to the public 
(Flight International, 9 January 2006). The terminal is not included in the numbering 
scheme even though it is the third terminal to be opened. 
In order to offer lower landing fees, handling fees and airport taxes, it cuts 
back on amenities such as aerobridges, elaborate physical structures and decorations 
in the passenger terminal building. Air conditioning, a range of duty-free shops and 
Food and Beverage (F&B) outlets, and free internet terminals are, however, available. 
There is no transfer facility at the Budget Terminal. Passengers who need to make 
transfers need to clear immigration, collect their luggage, clear customs, make their 
way to the main terminal by taking the free shuttle buses and check-in again with the 
respective airline. 




On 6 March 2008, Singapore’s Minister of State for Transport, Mrs. Lim 
Hwee Hua, informed the parliament that the budget terminal, which has handled 2.9 
million passengers since it first opened in March 2006, would be expanding at a cost 
of S$10 million. It will add 7 more check-in counters and 3 additional boarding gates 
as the budget terminal prepares to serve up to 9 airlines later in 2008. Today, the 
budget terminal is connected to 20 cities in the region - up from 12 in 2006 - by two 
LCCs which form about 10 percent of Changi's passenger traffic (Channel News Asia, 
6 March 2008). 
  
 




 3.5.8 Fifth freedom rights and the growth of low cost carriers 
 We have examined the relationship between the airports and the LCCs, 
looking at how some of the airports react to the growth and development of LCCs. 
Macau International Airport, for example, has been very forthcoming in accepting 




LCCs. Likewise, Singapore and Malaysia have fervently promoted the growth of such 
carriers and their airports have been geared up to cater to these airlines specifically. 
LCC terminals have been built in these two economies to suit the operation models of 
the LCCs. On the whole, airport authorities seem to have been going that extra mile to 
cater to these carriers. However, the aviation authorities and governments seem not to 
have done much to boost the growth of the LCC industry as a whole. In Chapter Two, 
we talked about “Freedoms of the Air” and highlighted how conventional airlines 
have capitalised on the use of the fifth freedom. This is clearly not the case for LCCs 
as most LCCs do not operate flights using the fifth freedom. While there are no 
concrete evidence to suggest why this is so, I will like to highlight that this could be 
due to aviation authorities being more unwilling to give the fifth freedom rights to a 
LCC. Aviation authorities tend to give that particular right to a FSC given that these 
airlines have the economic power to pay more for the various airport charges which 
come along with the given right. For example, FSCs which operate large aircrafts will 
pay more for the landing and parking at the respective airports. Some of the more 
established FSCs will also help to bring in more tourists. While these are just some 
assumptions, it will definitely be interesting for future researchers to look into this 
issue more deeply and provide a plausible explanation if the resources permit so.  
 
3.6 Chapter summary 
In this chapter I have provided a brief synopsis of the air travel scene, in 
particular the LCC industry, in the Far East and Southeast Asia regions. Firstly, I have 
looked at the overall growth of LCC in the two regions, focusing on the pioneers of 
the LCC development as well as their motivations. Secondly, I have illustrated the 
rise of the LCC travel industry in these two regions by outlining the growth of the 




specific LCCs based in the selected cities. The performances, as well as the unique 
features, of these carriers were highlighted. Last but not least, the development of the 
selected airports in relation to the rise of the LCCs was also brought up to highlight 
airport-airline relationship in the LCC industry. The understanding of the LCCs and 
the airports will certainly help in arriving at a more holistic assessment of the LCC 








































CHAPTER FOUR: METHODOLOGY 
4.1 Introduction 
Modeling, spatial analysis and other empiricist or positivist forms of analysis, 
with a strong emphasis on “the location and geographic pattern of transport systems 
and the magnitude of the movement or spatial interaction over the elements of such 
systems” (Black, 2003: 3) have been the key methodologies used in transport 
geography research. Such methods are important in offering an overview of the trends 
and processes shaping the modern day transport networks. Nonetheless, they fail to 
provide an in-depth analysis of some of the micro issues that are relevant, and such 
methods are often criticised with not keeping up with the paradigm changes in human 
geography. 
The focus of this research on LCCs and their impacts will centre on the 
airports and the LCCs, not forgetting the users or travellers on the LCCs. Data 
collection and analysis will take many forms, looking at broad issues like networks 
and supply issues down to micro-aspects such as that of traveller choice and 
behaviour, all of which impact not only on the LCCs themselves but also the airports 
and the air transport system as a whole. Whilst it is important to understand the 
business models of the LCCs and their relations with the airports, we must also take 
into account the customers of the LCCs who play a key role in the success of these 
airlines through their patronage. Such is the importance of behavioural and humanistic 
methods employed in transport geography to supplement the positivist school of 
thought as championed by notable scholars like Howard Gauthier and Donald Meinig. 
In essence, I will be employing a mixture of different research techniques to 
source the necessary information in understanding the impacts of LCCs. There will be 
several questions and phenomena to examine. The decision about which phenomena 




are meaningful is only one of the several decisions that must be made prior to data 
collection. Because the several decisions are interdependent, it is wise to organize 
these decisions into a research plan (Stoddard, 1982:14). 
 
4.2 Designing a research plan and sourcing for data 
Researchers who collect field data must be constantly aware of the human 
filters that distort observations of the empirical world. The realisation that each person 
employs a unique selectivity when observing phenomena impels some scholars to 
totally reject the methods of scientific positivism because the goals of perfect 
objectivity are unattainable. Personal biases and subliminal selectivity do exist, and 
consequently every field worker must adhere to procedures designed to minimise the 
distortions inherent in collecting data. In spite of its limitations, however, the 
scientific methodology does provide a valuable framework for guiding researchers in 
seeking answers about spatial issues (Stoddard, 1982) and thus forms a critical 
component of the research methodology for this thesis. Nevertheless, as mentioned in 
the previous section, qualitative methods, which are not of positivist tradition, are also 
employed to capitalise on its value of having the distinct advantage of being able to 
measure opinions and similar intangible attributes, which cannot be observed visually 
and must be expressed verbally by individuals possessing these attributes (Stoddard, 
1982:159). 
Primary data collection was carried out through statistics provided by the Civil 
Aviation Authority of Singapore (CAAS) which will be useful for data analysis as 
well as questionnaire surveys conducted with passengers who have flown on the 
LCCs. In-depth interviews with the relevant authorities, including CAAS, LCCs and 




specialists in the field were also conducted. This is to facilitate the understanding of 
the dynamics involved in shaping the LCCs and consequently their impacts.  
Geography is defined by its distinctive spatial focus through which the study 
of networks and linkages comes to the forefront. Network analysis is thus important 
and relevant to this research thesis.  
For the questionnaire surveys, the specific method used is similar to the study 
by Mason (2000) for his research on the propensity of business travellers to use 
LCCs. I have evaluated the value of a number of product elements in monetary terms 
by forcing the sample size of travelers to trade product benefits against travel 
expenditure. A Stated Preference methodology is used and in the words of Mason 
(2000), the technique “allows respondents to trade off one variable against another, 
because the market is in change and looking at past behaviour may not be a good 
indicator of future behaviour”. Open-ended questions were also included in the Stated 
Preference survey form so as to provide the qualitative balance to the research.  
 Respondents were selected based on the simple random sampling technique. 
Individuals from all walks of life and all age groups were selected. Due to the 
restricted timing given for this research project, the target was to achieve at least 120 
responses. This target was not achieved but the number of responses was not far from 
the target nevertheless. 100 respondents participated in the survey and all the 
questionnaires which they filled up were analysed and deemed usable. Before 
conducting the questionnaire survey, a pilot test was conducted that required five 
randomly selected people to complete the form.  
 As for the in-depth interviews, they have the dual advantage of usually 
yielding the highest response rate of any survey mechanism and, given effective 
interviewers, of permitting the use of a rather lengthy survey instrument. There are 




also several other advantages to using this method. Firstly, if a respondent provided 
an answer that contradicted earlier responses, the question can be re-read to ascertain 
whether the respondent perceived it correctly. Secondly, respondents cannot “see 
ahead” to the other questions. This will prevent respondents from using the same 
ideas posed in other questions. Thirdly, one can use the answer from one question as 
part of the next. Fourthly, the amount of missing information and “don’t know” is 
often much less than for a self-administered survey questionnaire. Lastly, for open-
ended questions, there is likely a higher response rate using the in-depth personal 
interview than a questionnaire survey (Sheskin, 1985:17). Yeung (1995:325) believes 
that “qualitative information gives the researcher a more realistic feel of the world 
that cannot be expressed in cold statistics”. Other data sources included conference 
proceedings, air industry studies and forecasts, airline and airport references, 
newspaper articles, books, journals and periodicals.  
 
4.3 Mapping airport networks 
Maps can be said to be the fundamental language of geography (DeMers, 
2000). In fact, maps have always been essential in geographers’ work for the very 
document contains within it the fundamental crux of geography – that is to study 
differences and patterns spatially. One of the underlying principles of the discipline 
geography is the search for spatial order; and because of this focus, geographers have 
developed a language that reflects the way they think about space. This spatial 
language, which is none other than mapping, allows the geographer to think more 
clearly and communicate more effectively about space. Montello and Sutton (2006) 
have commented that maps are obviously the quintessential geographic display, and 
geographers are the experts of the map as a data display tool.  




Yet, the use of spatial mapping in geography to depict patterns is often 
neglected due to its simplistic nature. The importance of maps has been championed 
by numerous prominent geographers, one of whom being Richard Hartshone when he 
stressed on the importance of the use of maps in geographic work such that if [the] 
problem cannot be studied fundamentally by maps, then it is questionable whether or 
not it is within the field of geography (Hartshone, 1939, cited in Wood & Keller, 
1996: 20). Whilst almost all of geographic work is textual in nature, there is no better 
method to depict spatiality then to use the map which essentially is a depiction of 
spatial reality on a small, manageable scale. 
Henceforth, for this research, I contend that mapping connections by the LCCs 
from Singapore allows us to see specific spatial patterns associated with the LCCs as 
well as tracing their development of routes and network over time. Thus, all 
connections from Singapore by the LCCs were compiled over the sample two-year 
period, starting from June 2006 to June 2008 and depicted on a map (Figure 4.1). The 
specific types of connections by the LCCs include: 
I. routes currently served by both LCCs and FSCs 
II. routes previously served by FSCs and now given exclusively to LCCs 
III. routes opened and served exclusively by LCCs 
IV. routes previously opened and served by LCCs but have been terminated 
V. routes opened by FSCs, given to LCCs, and returned to FSCs 
VI. routes opened by FSCs, given to LCCs and now served by neither 
VII. routes served by both FSCs and LCCs at one point, now served only by 
FSCs 
 




Type I is indicative of a very popular route which both the FSCs and LCCs 
want to have a share of the market while type II suggests that the FSCs may have lost 
out to the LCCs in the market share such that the former has backed off from the 
competition. Type III shows the bravery and success of LCCs in carving out a market 
of their own while type IV shows the bravery but failure of such an action. Type V 
indicates that even when given a chance by the FSCs, the LCCs have failed to capture 
the particular market and that FSCs is more favoured by travellers. Type VI tells of a 
market which produces low yield for both the FSCs and LCCs such that neither wants 
to continue serving this particular market. Type VII shows that FSCs has emerged as 
the victor when they compete with LCCs on that particular routing. In addition to 
Figure 4.1, Table 4.1 reflects the various types of connections stated above in a table 
form to give readers an alternative form of visual representation of the network 
pattern of the LCCs serving Singapore. Finally, table 4.2 will provide information on 
the routes in terms of the distance. This table will be useful for readers to see that the 
focus of the LCCs in this region is on short haul flights, resulting in the absence of 
links to several growing markets in the Far East and Southwest Asia as these 
destinations are beyond the five-hour range limit these LCCs have set for themselves 
as a result of the aircraft type they are using. 
As with all forms of cartographic representations, there exist limitations with 
this method. Firstly, the linkages show only connections between city-pairs, but do 
not depict frequency or volume. Secondly, the linkages are purely imaginary lines 
depicting routes, and are drawn in a way to avoid overlapping with one another. As 
such, readers may be misled into believing that the actual flight paths are being 
depicted by the lines when in actual fact, the actual shortest flight paths will be curved 
differently due to the Greater Circle Effect of the spherical earth’s surface. The base 




maps are based on the Mercator projection, which may also mislead readers when 
estimating distances between city-pairs. 
 
 









































Routes previously served by FSCs and now given 
exclusively to LCCs 






Routes opened and served exclusively by LCCs 2 Clark 
Haikou 
Routes previously opened and served by LCCs but 
have been terminated since 
1 Udon Thani 
Routes opened by FSCs, given to LCCs and 
returned to FSCs 
1 Danang 
Routes opened by FSCs, given to LCCs, and now 
not served by either 
2 Hatyai 
Krabi 
Routes served by FSCs and LCCs at one point, 
currently served only by FSCs 















Destinations (in alphabetical order) Distance from Singapore (miles) 
Bangalore 1971 
Bangkok 880 
Cairns (via Darwin) 2077 + 1041 = 3118 
Cebu 1505 
Chennai 1816 










Ho Chi Minh 679 








Melbourne (via Darwin) 2077 + 1948 = 4025 
Padang 296 
Perth 2432 
Phnom Penh 706 
Phuket 607 
Shenzhen 1611 
Siem Reap 833 
Surabaya 856 
Taipei 2002 




Table 4.2: Destinations served by LCCs and their distances from Singapore 
(Source: Author) 
(Note: * Actual distance is not available from various databases. Distance reflected is 
based on its nearest airport, which is Manila Ninoy Aquino International Airport.) 
 
 
4.4 Flight frequency, schedule and volume 
The number of aircraft movements and passenger volumes can tell us how 
well the LCCs are doing and how the airports serving them are impacted in a way. 




The number of scheduled weekly flights and the seats supplied to the destinations 
served by the LCCs are important consideration in the global airline network to assess 
the relative connectedness and hierarchical relationships between the airports. Such 
statistics therefore were obtained where available. 
A careful examination of flight schedules of the LCCs serving Singapore 
enables us to gain an insight into the extent to which LCCs are growing (or declining) 
as well as how their increasing (or decreasing) flights can affect the “hub” status of 
Changi Airport. Further analysis of flight scheduling and seats supply highlights how 
LCCs select their routes and schedule their flights in order to achieve profit 
maximisation.  
 
4.5 Physical examination of the airports 
Field visits to the selected airports in the region were made so as to examine 
the spatial configuration of the airports with respect to the development of LCCs. 
Observations were made on how airports have (re)organised their space to 
accommodate the growth of such carriers, for example, in terms of whether to build 
separate terminals specifically catered for use by the LCCs (as in the case of 
Singapore and Kuala Lumpur). The field visits will enable me to visualise the changes 
in the ground and gathering first hand information on the changes, if there were any. 
 
4.6 Large-scale quantitative and qualitative survey  
A survey is useful when the data required are based on the responses of a large 
number of people in order for certain patterns or trends to be deciphered (Cloke et al, 
2004). The aim of this survey is to compare passengers’ selection criteria for a LCC 
flying the Singapore – Bangkok sector, so as to determine the preferred business 




model for a LCC operating in the Southeast Asian region. It is important to 
understand the factors that drive travellers in their selection of a LCC so as to achieve 
growth in this market and understand how the LCCs and adapt, change and develop in 
a sustainable way. Currently, the business models adopted by the LCCs operating on 
the Singapore – Bangkok sector differ and, beyond this route, there are several 
business models for airline operations out there in the market. It will therefore be 
useful to know which business model is favoured by passengers in this region. 
Appendix 1 shows the questionnaire used for the survey. 
In part 1 of the questionnaire, respondents were supposed to indicate the price 
that they were willing to pay for each additional top-up of frills in a general LCC (that 
is, not for the specific LCC which they have flown on this particular sector) for the 
Singapore-Bangkok sector on a one-way basis. They were to do so with reference to 
the base price given. The base price was derived based on a completely no-frills 
concept of flying. In this case, the base price used was based on the advertised non-
promotional price of Tiger Airways for the sector in the month of November, 2006. 
The use of Tiger Airways’ price was based on the fact that the carrier’s business 
operation model was akin to the completely no-frills concept as indicated in the table 
for the survey. The more the respondents were willing to pay for each respective top-
up, the likelihood that that particular top-up was of concern to the respondent and 
therefore indicative of its importance and relevance to LCCs when they are 
formulating their business model.  
Part 2 of the questionnaire is similar to Part 1 but the prices to be penned down 
by the respondents were for the LCC which they had personally flown with for the 
Singapore-Bangkok sector. The main purpose of this section is to see if personal 
experience with a particular LCC can affect a traveller’s willingness to pay more for 




additional top-up of amenities. If personal experiences do affect travellers’ 
willingness to pay less or more for additional top-up of amenities, the LCCs will then 
have to ensure that they build up a reputation first before they decide to change their 
business model. More importantly, it may also mean that new LCCs which wish to 
enter the market must be prudent in their choice of business model. Otherwise, they 
may end up losing customers simply because of bad experiences of travellers as a 
result of the poor business model of the airline itself.  
The final part of the questionnaire is to gather qualitative feedback from 
respondents so as to elicit more information regarding their responses in Part 1 and 2. 
For example, respondents were supposed to indicate which of the frills stated in the 
questionnaire was of utmost importance to them and why was that so.  
There are certain limitations to this method such as the generalisation to the 
broader population but given the timeframe and nature of the study, this is 
understandable. Another major difficulty faced during the data collection was the 
difficulty in getting respondents for the survey. Many people gave a nonchalant 
attitude towards the author’s request for them to take part in the survey. Networking is 
essential and critical and the author is glad that some of his friends and colleagues 
help out by getting respondents for him. The specific rubric in relation to this survey 
will be covered in greater details in Chapter Six. 
 
4.7 In-depth interviews 
In depth interviews with aviation officials from Singapore and the 
aforementioned selected countries/cities were planned to allow me an insight into the 
policy arena of LCC development in the region. Furthermore, data collected from 
these interviews would supplement the existing empirical and questionnaire data. 




However, in requests for interviews with the aviation authorities from the 
countries/cities listed, most did not reply to my request. Nonetheless, a semi-formal 
in-depth interview was conducted with Mr. James Fong and Mr. Daniel Loo from the 
Airline Development division of the CAAS. Interviews with airlines as well as 
regional specialists (including Hong Kong, Macau, the Philippines, and Thailand) in 
the field of air transport were also conducted. Qualitative data collected from the 
interviews is used to support the quantitative data gathered. Table 4.3 illustrates the 
respondents for the interviews which have been conducted and the period in which 
these interviews were conducted. 
 
Period Interviewees 
July 2007 Mr. Chira Pranchio, Department of Geography, Chiang Mai 
University, Thailand 
August 2007 Mr. Michael Newcombe, General Manager (Corporate 
Development), Viva Macau Airlines, Macau S.A.R. 
September 2007 Dr. Kasem Choocharukul, Department of Civil Engineering, 
Chulalongkorn University, Thailand 
December 2007 Professor Li Si-ming, Department of Geography, Baptist 
University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong S.A.R. 
 
Associate Professor Wang Donggen, Department of Geography, 
Baptist University of Hong Kong, Hong Kong S.A.R. 
 
Dr. Joe Zhou, Faculty of International Tourism, Macau University 
of Science and Technology 
January 2008 Assistant Professor Daniel Mabazza, Department of Geography, 
University of the Philippines 
February 2008 Associate Professor Becky Loo, Department of Geography, 
University of Hong Kong 
June 2008 Mr James Fong, Manager (Airline Development), Civil Aviation 
Authority of Singapore 
 
Mr Daniel Loo, Assistant Manager (Airline Development), Civil 
Aviation Authority of Singapore 
 
Table 4.3: Interviewees for the research 
(Source: Author) 
 




4.8  A study framework for analysing the impacts and sustainability of the low 
cost carrier industry 
 
 As part of the research methodology, it is important to develop a study 
framework to analyse the issues to be raised and discussed in this research. As the title 
suggests, this research is aimed at finding out the impacts of LCCs on Singapore, with 
comparison with other airports in the region. When we talk about impacts, there must 
be a proper classification of the types of impacts and in order to do so, there is a need 
to understand the different dimensions of the air transport system.  
As we will be looking at air transport using a systems approach, the 
framework used for this research will be based on definition of indicator systems each 
consisting of a set of indicators related to different dimensions of the system 
performance, that is, operational, economic, social and environmental. In the scope of 
each indicator system, separate subsets of indicators are defined to express the 
objectives and sometimes conflicted preferences and interests of the various actors 
involved in the system. These actors include air transport operators, air travelers, local 
and central government and the likes (Janic, 2002:116). The framework is akin to 
Janic’s (2002) model but has been largely modified to suit the context of this research. 
It is to be noted that, for the purpose of this research, the focus will only be on the 
operational and economic indicator system of impacts.  
 The operational indicator system of impacts relates to elements such as 
demand and capacity supply, quality of service, and safety and security. Demand has 
been mostly driven by the external forces while capacity has been always adjusted in 
order to satisfy demand at any given level of efficiency and effectiveness, that is, 
quality of service. Safety and security have inherently been included in the system 
planning, operation and management at both the local and global level (Janic, 
2002:118). 




 The operational indicator influences the economic indicator, which consists of 
the elements such as the system operational costs, revenues, profits and productivity 
(Hooper and Hensher, 1997). The size and scope of the economic dimension depends 
mostly on the size and scope of the supply (capacity), which is adjusted to present and 
prospective demand. The economic indicator increases with the increasing of the 
operational indicator and vice versa (Janic, 2002). 
 If we follow the vertical organization of air transport services, there will be 
different group of actors whom may be involved in dealing with the sustainability of 
the LCC industry (ATAG, 2000, and INFRAS, 2000). The list of actors is non-
exhaustive but can include the following: 
1. Users such as air travellers; 
2. Air transport operators such as airports; 
3. Local and central government which mainly play roles in creating policies 
to regulate the system operations at both the local and global level; and 
 
4. Aviation or political organizations coordinating the system development at 
the international level. 
 
Figure 4.2 shows the framework used for this research, which is a scheme of the 
vertical organization of a LCC air transport system developed for defining the 
indicator system of impacts and sustainability of the industry in itself. In essence, the 
framework helps to identify the different actors involved in the LCC industry aside 
from LCC themselves; these actors’ individual agenda which comprises their 
objectives and preferences; how they impact the LCCs and the industry as whole and 
the specific types of impacts they make; and how each of their impacts will affect 
other actors of the industry as well. The arrows serve to remind the cyclical nature of 
the actions and impacts of the different actors of the industry. 
 





Figure 4.2: Indicator system of impacts and sustainability of the LCC industry 
(Source: Author) 
 
4.9    Chapter summary 
This chapter presents some of the specific methodological tools used in this 
research on the impacts of LCCs on Singapore. Both quantitative and qualitative 
methods have been employed for the purpose of methodological triangulation so as to 
garner different kinds of data to give a more holistic assessment. This also ensures the 
reliability and validity of the data collected and arguments made as the benefit of 
employing different methods is such that each provides a countercheck to another. 
The perceived and realised benefits and shortfalls of the different methods have also 
been accounted for and the author has illustrated how some of the methodological 
difficulties were overcome. Last but not least, this chapter has also presented a study 
framework which highlights the key factors and concepts that are the building blocks 










CHAPTER FIVE: FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to look at the current state of LCCs (Singapore-based or 
otherwise) serving Singapore using a range of empirical tools. Firstly, I will attempt 
to trace the development of routes and networks of the LCCs serving Singapore 
through the use of spatial mapping techniques. This will also allow us to see a specific 
spatial development pattern of the LCCs, aside from knowing their physical 
expansion. Secondly, there will be an examination on the flight frequency and 
capacity of seat supply of these LCCs. The number of scheduled weekly flights and 
seats supplied to the destinations served by the LCCs are important considerations in 
the global airline network to assess the relative connectedness, connectivity and 
hierarchical relationships between the airports. As the thesis is about finding the 
impacts of LCCs, it is important therefore to assess how the LCCs have affected or 
will be affecting the growth of airports and more importantly, Singapore. Finally, any 
empirical discussion on networks and development cannot be detached from ground 
realities and the socio-political environment. An analysis of the aviation environment 
in the region is done to highlight how the impacts of LCCs are affected by the bigger 
environment. 
 
5.2 Network analysis of LCCs serving Singapore 
In order to understand the growth of LCCs, one of the most obvious ways to 
do so is to look at their physical expansion, not in terms of the number of aircrafts 
they purchase but rather the expansion of their networks, that is, the number of 
destinations they serve. Looking at the networks of the individual LCCs serving 
Singapore will help us understand their individual expansions over the years which 




will be useful to understand how each of them has penetrated the Singapore market 
over time. An overlay comprising all the destinations served by the various LCCs to 
and from Singapore, with FSCs factored in, will give a holistic assessment of the 
status of LCC expansion and impacts on Singapore as an aviation hub.  As mentioned 
in the preceding chapter, all connections from Singapore by the LCCs were compiled 
over the sample two-year period, starting from June 2006 to June 2008 and depicted 
on maps. This was made possible through the data supplied by the Civil Aviation 
Authority of Singapore (CAAS). Only direct flights were considered for this 
assessment. 
 
5.3 Overview of the spatial networks of LCCs 
By observing the maps closely, we are able to derive distinctive spatial 
patterns associated with the different LCCs serving Singapore. Most of the capital and 
primary cities in the region are served by either the LCC of the home country or at 
least one Singapore-based LCC, with the exception of Vientiane which is not served 
by any of the LCCs directly to and from Singapore. In terms of secondary-city 
coverage, different LCCs have different focal markets. For example, if we were to 
compare the destinations served by Jetstar Asia and Tiger Airways, it will be 
interesting to see that Jetstar Asia has strong presence in the Indonesian and Indo-
China (except Thailand) market, providing many more direct connections between 
cities in Indonesia, Myanmar, Cambodia and Singapore versus that of Tiger Airways. 
In stark contrast, Tiger Airways’ network has a distinctive Thailand and Mainland 
China focus, with direct connections to many Thailand cities as well as Mainland 
Chinese cities at one point or another in time. Jetstar Asia pales in this respect. Both 
have been competing aggressively for the Singapore-Australia market as Qantas 




Airways of Australia has a 49% stake in Jetstar Asia while Tiger Airways has 
successfully opened a subsidiary, named Tiger Airways Australia in the land down 
under, with Melbourne being set-up as a secondary hub. The other non-Singapore-
based LCCs serve mainly routes between Singapore and their home countries, partly 
due to the restricted Air Services Agreements (ASAs) in this part of the world. This 
issue will be elaborated more in the subsequent parts of this chapter. Let us now take 
a look at the route maps of the various LCCs which serve flights to and from 
Singapore as well as a map showing all the routes served by the LCCs to and from 
Singapore, with FSCs factored in. It is of importance to note that all information on 
the destinations served is correct as of 30 June 2008. New routes added after 30 June 
2008 are not factored into the display nor discussion. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Destinations served by Air Asia group to and from Singapore 
(Source: Author) 
 









Figure 5.3: Destinations served by Lion Air to and from Singapore 
(Source: Author) 











Figure 5.4(b): Destinations served by Jetstar group to and from Singapore 
(Source: Author) 











Figure 5.5(b): Destinations served by Tiger Airways to and from Singapore 
(Source: Author) 
 







Figure 5.6: Destinations served by all LCCs to and from Singapore with FSCs 




5.3.1 Detailed analysis of the spatial networks of LCCs 
 
 Figures 5.1 to 5.3 show the destinations served by foreign-based LCCs which 
flies to and from Singapore. It is very clear that these foreign-based LCCs serve only 
destinations within their home country to and from Singapore, with the exception of 
Lion Air which flies to Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam, in addition to its home cities of 
Jakarta and Denpasar. The reason, as mentioned in the earlier part of this chapter, is 
that of the restrictive ASAs. Currently, countries within the region need to go into 
bilateral talks and sign bilateral agreements to allow foreign carriers to fly beyond the 




usual home and receiving destinations. For example, if Malaysia Airlines wants to fly 
from Singapore to Surabaya in Indonesia, it will need to get the nod from both the 
aviation authorities in Singapore and Indonesia. In short, there is no open skies policy 
within the region at this point in time. Given that many countries want to protect their 
national carriers, it will be difficult to negotiate for a liberal aviation agreement in 
which a carrier can apply the 5th freedom rights to fly beyond the intended destination. 
This explains why the majority of the foreign-based LCCs only fly between their 
home country’s cities and Singapore.  
Another reason will be that LCCs’ modus operandi is that of using the point-
to-point system instead of the hub-and-spoke system. Therefore, it will be rare to see a 
foreign-based LCC fly to a destination using Singapore as the stopover destination. It 
is difficult of them to also fly from a destination which is not from its home base to 
Singapore because that will entail them having to set up a foreign base, which not 
many countries favour, especially in this part of the world. So far, only Macau and 
Australia have been fairly liberal in their aviation policies by allowing foreign airlines 
to set up hubs/bases in their country/territory. 
 In figures 5.4(a) and (b), we can see that the Jetstar group, comprising the 
parent company Jetstar and its subsidiaries of Jetstar Asia and Valuair, has a strong 
presence in the Indonesian market as well as in Indo-China. The longer-distance 
routes such as Xiamen and Kolkata have been given up, probably due to higher costs, 
especially with the rising fuel costs. Flying shorter routes, which have high demand 
such as Bangkok and Ho Chi Minh, is critical to the survival of a LCC. This is 
because the carrier can fly more times to these destinations on a daily basis, given the 
short flight time as well as turnaround time. The Singapore-Bangkok sector has 
always been a route which is of high demands (this will be explained in greater detail 




in Chapter Six) while the fact that Jetstar Asia has increased its services from 7 to 14 
times weekly to Ho Chi Minh since March 2008 indicates the rapidly increasing 
demand from the city once known as the “Paris of the Orient”. 
 Worthy of note is that Jetstar, through its subsidiary Valuair, has been 
expanding its foray into the Indonesian market rapidly over the last few years. 
Geopolitics has a role to play in this interesting phenomenon. Valuair was the only 
LCC to be given rights to fly into the key Indonesian cities such as Jakarta and 
Surabaya by the Indonesian aviation authority because the latter deems that Valuair is 
not a true-blue LCC. Tiger Airways was granted landing rights only in Padang and 
before it could ask for more rights, the Indonesian side decided to stop issuing air 
rights to Singapore-based LCCs in a bid to retaliate against the CAAS’ decision not 
to allow the then Awair (later renamed Indonesia Air Asia) from flying into Singapore 
(Airliner World, April 2005). Capitalising on the fact that it is now the only 
Singapore-based LCC to be able to fly between Singapore and major Indonesian 
cities, Valuair has since increased flight frequencies to Jakarta from once a day during 
inauguration of the route to three times daily currently as well as maintaining flight 
services to the other two key destinations of Denpasar and Surabaya. The Indonesian 
travel market is a very lucrative one given that Indonesians have consistently been the 
top inbound travel market for Singapore. For example, for the first half of 2008, 
Indonesians top the visitor-generating markets list with 855, 000 travellers coming 
into Singapore (Singapore Tourism Board, 2008) (Table 5.1). With increasing flights 
to Indonesian cities operated by the Jetstar group, the economic impact on Singapore 
by the carrier is likely to be positive. 
 
 















Table 5.1: Visitor Arrivals from January to June 2008 
(Source: Singapore Tourism Board website, 2008) 
 
  
In Figures 5.5(a) and (b), we can see that Tiger Airways has a strong presence 
in Thailand, as well as India and the southern parts of Mainland China. Its presence in 
Thailand has, however, decreased in recent months, following the suspension of 
services to Chiang Mai, Hatyai and Krabi. Services to India as well as Mainland 
China remain strong in terms of the number of flights plied on a weekly basis. If we 
were to correlate this with the STB data as shown on Table 5.1, it will not be difficult 
to understand why Tiger Airways have maintained the routes to the Chinese and 
Indian cities. Vice-versa, the strong inbound tourists’ figures posted by China and 
India could have also been a result of LCCs, especially Tiger Airways, making their 
presence in these two countries.  
 Strong demands from Mainland China have prompted Tiger Airways to open 
up more routings, with the carrier adding Xiamen to the existing three destinations, 
Source: Disembarkation/Embarkation Cards
* Visitor Arrivals for the Top 15 countries are arranged in descending order for Jan-Jun 2008 and represent over 85% of total arrivals
Visitor Arrivals, Top 15 Markets, Jan – Jun 08
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namely Guangzhou, Haikou and Shenzhen, in October 2007. In addition, flights to 
Hatyai were terminated to shift the capacity to the Indian cities of Bangalore and 
Chennai (Bangkok Post, 2 November 2007), thus illustrating the strong demands from 
the Indian market.  
 Also of interest would be that Tiger Airways has been the sole Singapore-
based LCC that opened up several new routings which the FSCs have never ventured 
into before. The carrier initiated maiden services from Singapore to Clark in the 
Philippines, Haikou in Mainland China, and Udon Thani in Thailand. Udon Thani has 
since been dropped, probably due to poor load factors, but Haikou and Clark remain 
on the list. In terms of spatial impacts, it can be seen that Tiger Airways has helped to 
maximise the bilateral ASAs signed between Singapore and China as well as the 
Philippines, thereby increasing the connectedness of Singapore to the region. This 
will, in no small way, also helped to boost the hub status of Singapore on a broader 
perspective. 
 Figure 5.6, which is an overlay of all the routes served by LCCs to and from 
Singapore with FSCs factored into the picture, allows us to take a look at the 
development of routes (spatial expansion or contraction) by the LCCs over time. It is 
of interest to note that LCCs have emerged relatively strong in terms of capturing 
some of the markets. For example, destinations like Macau and Padang which were 
once served only by FSCs are now exclusively served by LCCs. There are even 
selected Australian routes which are now served exclusively by LCCs, such as that of 
the Singapore-Darwin, Singapore-Darwin-Cairns, and the Singapore-Darwin-
Melbourne (vice-versa) routings. When the Singapore-based LCCs first started flying 
back in 2004, there was a concentration of services to only Southeast Asian 
destinations (with Hong Kong being an exception). As time goes by, however, the 




spatial reach of the LCCs began to expand outwards, eventually reaching the southern 
coastline cities of China as well as India. With competition for the Australian market 
intensifying, LCCs have even gone as far as Melbourne, with Darwin as a layover 
point. At the same time, it is troubling to note that LCCs have been faring badly for 
various Singapore-Thailand destinations, including Chiang Mai, Hatyai, Krabi and 
Udon Thani. There was one point in time when LCCs served as many as six 
destinations in Thailand from Singapore. However, as of 30 June 2008, only Bangkok 
and Phuket are served by LCCs from Singapore. This actually represents a spatial 
contraction for LCCs flying between the kingdom and Singapore. Despite a drastic 
cut in terms of the number of routes served by LCCs to and from Thailand, the tourist 
arrivals from the kingdom remain strong as Thailand was the top 11th tourists-
generating country for the first half of 2008 as seen from Table 5.1. This may actually 
suggest that the impacts of LCCs on Singapore’s tourism landscape may not be that 
great after all.   
There are also selected destinations in which the FSCs seem to have a stronger 
foothold than LCCs such that LCCs gave up flying to and from these destinations and 
FSCs taking back the air rights. Examples would include Danang, Davao and Kolkata. 
In short, there has been a spatial expansion of routings by the LCCs serving 
Singapore, with the expansion very much focused on the peripheries of Southeast 
Asia (to places like Mainland China, India and Australia). Internally, within the 
region, however, there seems to be a contraction of the spatial limits of LCCs and this 
is evident in the reduction of several Singapore-Thailand routings as well as dropping 
off Danang and Davao from the list of destinations served.  
A closer examination on the route networks of the LCCs serving Singapore 
also brought out some other rather interesting observations. Firstly, despite Tiger’s 




use of Clark as a secondary hub and the re-entry of Cebu Pacific Air into Singapore 
skies, many Filipino destinations are still not connected to Singapore by the LCCs. 
Laos fared worse, with no connections at all by the LCCs to Singapore, not even so by 
the FSCs. Many destinations in East Malaysia are also not connected with Singapore 
by the LCCs. We can also see from the route maps that when considering the region 
as a whole, the network coverage provided by the LCCs is still not as extensive as 
those of Europe or the USA. In fact, many secondary cities are not connected to 
Singapore by the LCCs, which is unusual for the LCC market if we were to make a 
comparison with the other side of the world. Over in Europe and in the USA, 
secondary cities and their airports are favoured by LCCs by virtue of cheaper 
operating costs. Therefore, in terms of ground impacts made by the LCCs on 
Singapore as well as the region, we differ very much from our counterparts in the 
west. For them, in terms of land-use planning, they will need to consider the 
possibility of secondary cities becoming air transport hubs for LCCs but for us in Asia 
and not just in Singapore; we will need to consider the spatial planning of our primary 
cities and airports to accommodate the growth of LCCs. The difference in the 
development trajectories of LCCs in this part of the world from that of the west 
actually brings about a whole new set of impacts on spatial planning issues which 
planners need to consider.  
 
5.4 Analysis of flight frequencies, volumes and schedules 
 The earlier sections have dealt with the idea of connectedness (how connected 
Singapore is to the rest of the region by the LCCs). To provide a more holistic 
assessment of the impacts of LCCs on Singapore, there is still an additional element 
that needs to be considered and that is connectivity – the frequency and volume of 




flights. Thus, Singapore may be well connected to many cities in the region, but 
overall connectivity will still be low if flight frequencies are low. Similarly, passenger 
and cargo volumes are determined by aircraft type that is used on different routes. An 
airport’s hub status can be affected by the issue of connectivity and flight frequencies, 
schedules, and seat capacities (type of aircraft used) are the determinants involved in 
assessing connectivity of the airport concerned.  
 For practical reasons, it is not possible to examine all flights and volumes over 
two years. Instead, I have compiled data pertaining to the schedules of the LCCs 
serving Singapore for the following selected months – July 2006, July 2007, and June 
2008. By doing so, we can also visualise the year-on-year growth (positive or 









Total no. of 
seats supplied 
weekly 
CGK-SIN v.v. B735 28 132 3696 
 
July 2007 





Total no. of 
seats supplied 
weekly 
CGK-SIN v.v. B735 28 132 3696 
 
Note: Data on Adam Air not available for June 2008 as the airline has shut down 
since January 2008. 
 
Table 5.2(a): Flight schedules of Adam Air for July 2006 and July 2007 























Total no. of 
seats supplied 
weekly 









Total no. of 
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weekly 









Total no. of 
seats supplied 
weekly 
BKK-SIN v.v. B733 42 144 6048 
BKK-SIN v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
HKT-SIN v.v. B733 14 144 2016 
KUL-SIN v.v. A320 28 180 5040 
Total no. of seats supplied for all the routes 15624 
 
Table 5.2(b): Flight schedules of Air Asia group for July 2006, July 2007 and June 
2008 


































Total no. of 
seats supplied 
weekly 
MNL-SIN v.v. A320 14 179 2506 
CEB-SIN v.v. A319 12 150 1800 









Total no. of 
seats supplied 
weekly 
MNL-SIN v.v. A320 14 179 2506 
CEB-SIN v.v. A319 10 150 1500 
DVO-SIN v.v. A319 6 150 900 
Total no. of seats supplied for all the routes 4906 
 
Note: Data on Cebu Pacific Air not available for July 2006 as the carrier has yet to 
inaugurate services to Singapore then. 
 
Table 5.2(c): Flight schedules of Cebu Pacific Air for July 2007 and June 2008 






































Total no. of 
seats supplied 
weekly 









Total no. of 
seats supplied 
weekly 
CGK-SIN v.v. B739 14 212 2968 
CGK-SIN-
SGN v.v. 
B739 28 212 5936 
Total no. of seats supplied for all the routes 8904 
 
Note: Data on Lion Mentari Airlines not available for July 2006 as the carrier has yet 
to inaugurate services to Singapore then. 
 
Table 5.2(d): Flight schedules of Lion Mentari Airlines for July 2007 and June 2008 













Total no. of 
seats supplied 
weekly 
SIN-BKK v.v. A320 42 180 7560 
SIN-HKT v.v. A320 8 180 1440 
SIN-BLR v.v. A320 10 180 1800 
SIN-HKG v.v. A320 28 180 5040 
SIN-MNL v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-PNH v.v. A320 6 180 1080 
SIN-REP v.v. A320 6 180 1080 
SIN-TPE v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-RGN v.v. A320 6 180 1080 
SIN-DPS v.v. A320 6 162 972 
SIN-CGK v.v. A320 42 162 6804 
SIN-SUB v.v. A320 8 162 1296 
Total no. of seats supplied for all the routes 33192 
 
 
















A320 14 177 2478 
SIN-BKK v.v. A320 42 180 7560 
SIN-SGN v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-HKT v.v. A320 12 180 2160 
SIN-HKG v.v. A320 28 180 5040 
SIN-MNL v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-PNH v.v. A320 6 180 1080 
SIN-REP v.v. A320 6 180 1080 
SIN-TPE v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-RGN v.v. A320 6 180 1080 
SIN-DPS v.v. A320 8 162 1296 
SIN-CGK v.v. A320 42 162 6804 
SIN-SUB v.v. A320 12 162 1944 















A320 14 177 2478 
SIN-DRW-
MEL v.v. 
A320 14 177 2478 
SIN-BKK v.v. A320 28 180 5040 
SIN-SGN v.v. A320 32 180 5760 
SIN-HKG v.v. A320 28 180 5040 
SIN-MNL v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-PNH v.v. A320 6 180 1080 
SIN-REP v.v. A320 6 180 1080 
SIN-TPE v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-RGN v.v. A320 8 180 1440 
SIN-MFM v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-KUL v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-DPS v.v. A320 8 162 1296 
SIN-CGK v.v. A320 56 162 9072 
SIN-SUB v.v. A320 12 162 1944 
SIN-MES v.v. A320 12 162 1944 
Total no. of seats supplied for all the routes 48732 
 
Table 5.2(e): Flight schedules of Jetstar group for July 2006, July 2007 and June 2008 
(Source: compiled by author from CAAS flight schedules) 














Total no. of 
seats supplied 
weekly 
SIN-BKK v.v. A320 22 180 3960 
SIN-CNX v.v. A320 6 180 1080 
SIN-HDY v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-KBV v.v. A320 8 180 1440 
SIN-HKT v.v. A320 18 180 3240 
SIN-CRK v.v. A320 28 180 5040 
SIN-MFM-CRK v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-DRW v.v. A320 8 180 1440 
SIN-CAN v.v. A320 10 180 1800 
SIN-HAK v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-SZX v.v. A320 6 180 1080 
SIN-HAN v.v. A320 4 180 720 
SIN-SGN v.v. A320 16 180 2880 
SIN-PDG v.v. A320 6 180 1080 












Total no. of 
seats supplied 
weekly 
SIN-BKK v.v. A320 42 180 7560 
SIN-CNX v.v. A320 8 180 1440 
SIN-HDY v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-KBV v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-HKT v.v. A320 28 180 5040 
SIN-MFM v.v. A320 8 180 1440 
SIN-CRK v.v. A320 18 180 3240 
SIN-MFM-CRK v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-DRW v.v. A320 10 180 1800 
SIN-CAN v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-HAK v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-SZX v.v. A320 10 180 1800 
SIN-HAN v.v. A320 4 180 720 
SIN-SGN v.v. A320 16 180 2880 
SIN-PDG v.v. A320 4 180 720 
SIN-UTH v.v. A320 6 180 1080 
SIN-PER v.v. A320 14 180 2520 

















Total no. of 
seats supplied 
weekly 
SIN-BKK v.v. A320 28 180 5040 
SIN-MAA v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-DRW v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-CAN v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-HAK v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-HAN v.v. A320 4 180 720 
SIN-SGN v.v. A320 28 180 5040 
SIN-KUL v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-MFM-CRK v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-CRK v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-PDG v.v. A320 6 180 1080 
SIN-PER v.v. A320 22 180 3960 
SIN-HKT v.v. A320 14 180 2520 
SIN-SZX v.v. A320 10 180 1800 
SIN-XMN v.v. A320 8 180 1440 
SIN-BLR v.v. A320 8 180 1440 
Total no. of seats supplied for all the routes 40680 
 
Table 5.2(f): Flight schedules of Tiger Airways for July 2006, July 2007 and June 
2008 
(Source: compiled by author from CAAS flight schedules) 
 
 
Percentage (%) change in terms of total number of seats 
supplied by the carrier on a year-on-year basis as well as 
between 2006 and 2008 
Airline/Airline 
group 
2006-2007 2007-2008 2006-2008 
Adam Air 0 N.A. N.A. 
Air Asia group 0 93.8 93.8 
Cebu Pacific Air N.A. 13.9 N.A. 
Lion Airlines N.A. 302.5 N.A. 
Jetstar group 14.7 28.0 46.8 
Tiger Airways 36.8 -5.0 29.9 
 
Table 5.3: Comparison of the percentage growth in the number of seats supplied by 
the various LCCs flying to and from Singapore 












Number of return flights Number of total seats 
supplied 
Sector 
2006 2008 2006 2008 
SIN-BKK v.v. 120 112 19584 18648 
SIN-CGK v.v. 70 70 10500 12040 
SIN-Pearl River Delta 
(PRD) region v.v., 





58 80 10440 14400 
SIN-KUL v.v. 0 56 0 10080 
 
Table 5.4: Comparison of number of flights and seats between June 2006 and June 
2008 for selected sectors 
(Source: compiled by author from CAAS flight schedules) 
 
 
From the tables generated, it can be generalised that there is a positive trend in 
the growth and development of the LCC industry in the region, especially in terms of 
flights served by these carriers to and from Singapore. For instance, in Table 5.3, we 
see a whopping 93.8% growth in the seat supply by Air Asia group between 2007 and 
2008 as well as for the entire period between 2006 and 2008. This can be attributed 
largely to the inauguration of new flights between Singapore and Phuket as well as the 
much-hyped Singapore-Kuala Lumpur sector. After more than three decades of 
monopoly by Singapore Airlines and Malaysia Airlines, the Singapore-Kuala Lumpur 
sector was finally opened up to competition, albeit a limited one, in February 2008. 
The gradual liberalisation of the Singapore-Kuala Lumpur sector is a precursor to the 
eventual ASEAN Open Sky policy endeavoured to be launched by December 2008. 
Based on the outcomes of the last ASEAN Ministerial meeting, the Philippines will 
lead member countries of the ASEAN in signing a regional open skies accord in 
Manila by end of 2008. The accord's implementation would begin with unlimited 
flights between capital cities such that ASEAN’s national carriers would have the 
right to fly over an ASEAN-member country without the need to land; the right to 




stop in a country for maintenance or refuel without transferring passengers or cargo; 
and the right to carry passengers and cargo from one country to another and vice versa 
(Gulfnews website, 23 May 2008). Table 5.4 which shows a comparison of the total 
number of flights and seats between June 2006 and June 2008 for selected sectors 
further highlights the positive trend in the growth and development of the LCC 
industry in Singapore. With the exception of Bangkok which saw a slight dip in the 
figures, the rest of the sectors have seen a rise in their number of flights and/or seats 
supplied. In particular, the Singapore-Kuala Lumpur sector saw a big jump and the 
reason has been mentioned above, that is, the liberalisation of the sector. 
Overall, intra-ASEAN air services have remained highly restricted by 
protectionist policies aimed at insulating domestic air carriers from foreign 
competition over the past few decades. Li (1998: 140) noted that the sophistication 
and maturity level of the air transport industry in ASEAN is very different when 
compared to that of the west and that “deregulation is probably the only mechanism 
available to achieve a quantum leap in the development of the air transport industry”. 
The new agreement, therefore, has the potential to revolutionise all the ancient 
policies and help to usher in a new era of affordable intra-regional air travel (Asia 
Times Online, 6 July 2007). 
Thus, when we talk about how LCCs can impact us, we must first consider the 
bigger geopolitical environment. Only when the geopolitical environment is one that 
is conducive to the growth and development of such carriers can we start to question 
the impacts brought about by them.  
If we were to zoom in on the two Singapore-based LCC groups, it is 
interesting to note that the Jetstar group has been growing consistently over the last 
two years, not only in terms of increasing the connectedness of Singapore with other 




regional cities but also in terms of increasing the connectivity too. From Tables 5.2(e), 
we can see that the Jetstar group served only 12 destinations to and from Singapore, 
with a total of 33192 seats supplied on a weekly basis. By June 2008, the group was 
serving 17 cities and supplied a total of 48732 seats. Jakarta and Ho Chi Minh saw a 
great jump in terms of the number of seats supplied if we were to compare the 
statistics for July 2006 and June 2008 as well as July 2007 and June 2008 
respectively. It is unfortunate that the load factors for the individual routes were not 
able to be obtained, largely due to the issue of trade secrets. Otherwise, a more 
thorough analysis of the economic impacts could be analysed. Nevertheless, common 
logic would tell us that if there is no demand, there would not be supply. Henceforth, 
it is logical to arrived at the notion that the economic impacts brought about by the 
Jetstar group to Singapore are likely to be positive, given an overall growth in the 
number of seats supplied and in particular to destinations, such as Jakarta and Ho Chi 
Minh. 
The strange thing, however, is that Tiger Airways saw a dip in the number of 
seats supplied between 2007 and 2008. The percentage change is actually negative 
five percent. This can be attributed largely to the withdrawal of services to several of 
the Thailand cities as mentioned earlier on in the chapter. Not only was there a 
withdrawal of services to the affected destinations, the number flights to the capital 
city of Bangkok as well as the resort town of Phuket were also cut drastically from 42 
to 28 and 28 to 14 respectively (Table 5.2(f))! It is a pity that Tiger Airways has been 
unable to take full advantage of the open-skies agreement we have signed with 
Thailand in 2004.  
Despite Tiger Airways’ slightly dismal performance in terms of destinations 
served between 2007 and 2008, it raked in a profit for the year ending 31 March 2008 




as mentioned in Chapter Three of the thesis. Also, the overall growth of the LCC 
industry and the impacts brought about by the carriers upon Singapore are still on a 
positive note. The sheer pace of economic development in Southeast Asia has 
increased the propensity to travel, expanding rapidly the pool of air travellers. LCCs 
actually have the effect of feeding traffic into main hub airports, such as Singapore. 
 
Airlines July 2006 July 2007 May 2008 
Air Asia x x ☺ 
Cebu Pacific x ☺ ☺ 
Jetstar Asia ☺ ☺ ☺ 
Lion Mentari Airlines ☺ ☺ ☺ 
Tiger Airways ☺ ☺ ☺ 
Thai Air Asia ☺ ☺ ☺ 
Valuair ☺ ☺ ☺ 
Total (absolute number) 226,704 299,106 339,909 
 
KEY:  
x – denotes data for airline not included ☺ - denotes data for airline included 
  
Table 5.5: Aggregated Passenger Traffic on Low Cost Carriers 
(Source: CAAS, 2008) 
 
If we were to analyse the figures in Table 5.4, it is heartening to know that the number 
of passengers travelling on LCCs to and from Singapore has increased over the last 
two years. The numbers have shot up to 339,909 in May 2008 from 226,704 in July 
2006. In less than two years, the number of users of LCCs travelling to and from 
Singapore has increased by about 50%. The figures clearly reinforce the notion that 
LCCs can help to generate additional travellers for Singapore and thus boost our hub 
status in the regional aviation sector. Tourism receipts is boosted in a way too. Take 
for example, a traveller from Indonesia may take a LCC to Singapore to transfer to an 
international flight to Europe or the USA. Data and research is sorely lacking in this 
aspect of LCC impact on air travel, but an additional reason why airports seek to 




attract more LCC-transfer passengers is that they tend to spend a day or two at the 
transiting city, contributing to the local tourist economy. Therefore, the overall 
economic impacts by the LCCs can be said to be positive and beneficial to us. 
 
5.5 Physical examination of the airports in the region and qualitative 
interviews  
 
To understand how airports in the region are competing for the LCC market 
and how Singapore has responded to that, visits were made to selected airports in the 
region, aside from Changi Airport, to gain insights on the physical ground 
developments of these airports with respect to the development of the LCC travel 
market. The airports selected include Kuala Lumpur International Airport (KLIA), 
Kota Kinabalu International Airport (KKIA), Bangkok Suvarnabhumi Airport 
(Suvarnabhumi), Bangkok Don Mueang Airport (Don Mueang), Macau International 
Airport (Macau), Hong Kong International Airport (HKIA), Ninoy Aquino 
International Airport (NAIA) in the Philippines and last but not least, Diosdado 
Macapagal International Airport (DMIA) also in the Philippines.  
The rise of LCCs has seen massive infrastructural investment by airports in the 
region. Both Singapore and Kuala Lumpur have developed dedicated terminals for 
LCCs, providing the basic terminal necessities at affordable rates. Aerobridges, for 
example, are not found in these terminals to keep operating costs low. 
 





Plate 5.1: After disembarkation, passengers have to walk on the tarmac from the 




The growth of the LCC terminal has been healthy, both in Kuala Lumpur as 
well as Singapore. Singapore’s LCC terminal, the Budget Terminal, for instance, is 
handling an average of 144,000 passengers a month for the period January to May 
2008 (CAAS website, 2008). In fact, both Singapore and Kuala Lumpur have recently 
announced plans for future expansions for their LCC terminals. Kota Kinabalu has 
also unveiled its LCC terminal in January 2007, much to the delight of Air Asia, 
which has consistently seek to operate at airports which can provide lower costs of 
operation. Similar to its counterpart at KLIA, there are no aerobridges in this LCC 
terminal. However, the terminal building is very modern and nicely furbished such 
that the décor is much better than that of the LCC terminal in KLIA.  









 Over at Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Aviation Authority (HKAA) is not that 
keen on developing the LCC industry as compared to Singapore and Malaysia. There 
are many reasons to this phenomenon. According to an interviewee, Professor Li Si-
Ming of the Baptist University of Hong Kong, “[t]he air space in Hong Kong is very 
expensive and cheaper airports like Zhuhai and Macau are better prepared to serve the 
low cost carriers”. What Professor Li was trying to express is that it makes no 
economic sense for HKAA to try to give special concessions or go beyond the usual 
means to attract the LCCs. Given the high demand of landing rights at HKIA, there is 
no reason why HKAA needs to take the extra mile to try to win over LCCs to use its 
airport. Henceforth, HKIA has not built a separate terminal specifically for the LCCs, 
like what Malaysia and Singapore have done. There mere thing HKIA has done to 
lower costs for LCCs is to allow LCCs to use remote parking bays. This will help to 
save the cost of paying for the use of aerobridges for these carriers.  





Plate 5.3: Passengers queuing up to take a bus to the remote parking bay for Jetstar 




 On whether is there a possibility of converting the defunct Kai Tak Airport 
into an airport catering specifically to LCCs, Dr Wang Donggen of the Baptist 
University of Hong Kong said that this is unlikely because the Hong Kong 
government already has a plan in place for Kai Tak to “develop it to become an 
integrated and multi-functional area”. He also explained why Hong Kong is not very 
much bothered by the fact that places like Macau has been aggressive in her attraction 
for the LCCs. The reason is simple: “Hong Kongers do not have a strong confidence 
level in the sole LCC which the territory has – Oasis Hong Kong Airlines. The 
number of delays the airline has encountered since its maiden flight (the maiden flight 
to London was delayed by more than twelve hours) has worried Hong Kongers about 
the reliability of LCCs”. True enough, Oasis Hong Kong Airlines has since shut down 
after incurring more than HK$1 billion worth of debt. The failure of Oasis Hong 
Kong will only add on to the distrust Hong Kongers have in LCCs and therefore, there 




is really no need for the HKAA to go the extra mile to try to attract LCCs to use the 
HKIA. 
 Even if we were to talk about the possibility of setting up a LCC terminal at 
HKIA to cater to LCCs so as to capture the Mainland China market, Professor Li 
expressed that this could be done through the use of Zhuhai Airport in which HKIA 
has a share in it. Currently, Zhuhai Airport is underutilised and therefore, there is 
potential to turn the airport into a LCC hub so to speak so as to cater to the domestic 
travel market in Mainland China. There is no way Hong Kong can compete on costs 
with the Mainland China airports, thus it makes sense to instead develop the latter’s 
airport to cater to the LCC market, especially since HKIA has a share in the airport. 
 As mentioned earlier, Macau on the other hand has been aggressively trying to 
attract LCCs to use its airport. Dr Joe Zhou from the Macau University of Science and 
Technology expressed that there is every possibility of Macau becoming a hub for 
LCCs in the Pearl River Delta (PRD) region as “Macau could be the international gate 
to China”. However, he also noted that it will be unlikely that Macau will follow the 
footsteps of Singapore and Malaysia in building a specific terminal for the LCCs. This 
is because the current airport is considered to be a small scale venture and 
furthermore, the local authority “is still learning how to manage this city”. There are 
many other issues that the local government needs to prioritise when it comes to 
building up the territory as a whole, such as building up a good public transport 








Sharing the same sentiments is Mr. Michael Newcombe, the General Manager 
(Corporate Development) of Viva Macau Airlines which is the sole LCC based in 
Macau. He mentioned that:  
“It is difficult to compare Macau to the likes of Singapore and Kuala Lumpur. 
Both are mature markets looking to stimulate additional growth. Macau is at 
the beginning of its lifecycle in this regard. Building a LCC terminal is not a 










 In Southeast Asia, aside from Malaysia and Singapore, the aviation authorities 
of Thailand and the Philippines have been fairly pro-active in catering to the rise of 
LCCs. In Thailand, however, because of the change in the political scene, the fate of 
LCCs has also been put into spotlight. The interim military government following the 
overthrown of the Thaksin government had pushed for all domestic flights to operate 
from the old Don Mueang Airport. Thai Air Asia refused to shift back to Don Mueang 
unless the government allowed it to shift its international operations together with the 




domestic operations. Assistant Professor Kasem Choocharukul from Chulalongkorn 
University shared his views on why Thai Air Asia’s demands were logical. He said, 
“[i]f Thai Air Asia’s operations are to split between the two airports, there would 
definitely be problems such as passengers unable to connect between their 
international and domestic flights in time as the two airports are not near each other 
and the ground transportation connecting the two airports are not efficient enough”.  
The interim government refused to approve the request of Thai Air Asia and 
thus we see a split in terms of the operation grounds of the LCCs. The other Thailand-
based LCC, Nok Air, shifted its operations to Don Mueang while Thai Air Asia 
sticked to Suvarnabhumi Airport. At Suvarnabhumi, low cost carriers such as Thai 
Air Asia had the option of using remote parking bays, just like what is done in Hong 
Kong and Macau. This is unlike in Singapore, where all LCCs who do not use the 
Budget Terminal have to use the aerobridges.  
Despite the saga, the LCC travel industry in Thailand has been doing well, so 
much so that Mr. Chira Prangkio, a lecturer with Chiang Mai University, actually 
suggested that there is a possibility of developing Chiang Mai Airport into a 
secondary gateway to Thailand. In addition, there is a chance of turning the airport 
into a hub for the LCCs. He cited reasons such as, “[C]hiang Mai being a natural 
geographical hub for travelling between the northern parts of Thailand, and places in 
Myanmar, Laos, Northern Vietnam and southern parts of Mainland China”. If Chiang 
Mai Airport is to be developed in an airport catering specifically to the LCCs, then it 
will present an interesting phenomenon for transport researchers to examine. In the 
west, it is usually the secondary airports in the vicinity of the main airports which will 
become hubs for LCCs. If Chiang Mai does have the ability to attract enough LCCs to 
use the airport, then it will be the first incidence of a secondary gateway to a country 




becoming a hub for LCCs. A secondary gateway becoming a LCC hub is clearly 
different from a secondary airport becoming a LCC hub and therefore it will provide 
an interesting Asian experience should it really happen. 
 
 





 The opening of DMIA in Angeles City in the Philippines to civil aviation in 
2005 has been very much welcomed by the LCCs, with Tiger Airways quickly 
making the airport as its secondary hub, offering flights not just to Singapore but also 
to Macau. Assistant Professor Daniel Mabazza at the University of Philippines has 
expressed confidence in DMIA becoming a LCC hub for the region. He views that, 
“DMIA has a much bigger area for expansion unlike the old NAIA near downtown 
Manila which has limited space for further expansion projects”. He also mentioned 
that if the government has the political will to develop DMIA, he foresees that 
“DMIA can not only become a LCC hub but also an aviation hub for the Southeast 




Asia region within five to ten years”. He added that the Open Sky policy between 
ASEAN capitals as aforementioned will “help to further fuel the growth of DMIA as a 
regional LCC hub”. 
 A visit to DMIA shows that the airport indeed has vast areas of land which 
could be put to good use for further development. Two major LCCs, Air Asia and 
Tiger Airways, are currently the chief tenants at DMIA with Philippines-based Cebu 
Pacific asking for rights to fly from the airport as well.  
 
 




Back at home, it is without doubt that the Singapore government and CAAS 
have been actively promoting the growth of the LCC industry. The building of the 
Budget Terminal is a very good example of the commitment of the government. In an 
interview of the Manager for Airline Development at CAAS, Mr. James Fong, he 
expressed that “CASS will try as far as possible to accommodate the airlines in what 
they want”. However, he also stressed that “CAAS will be fair across the board” 
meaning that there will not be special incentives placed in to try to win specific LCCs 




to use the airport. For example, even when it comes to selection of ground handlers, 
the LCCs are left to their own discretion on which ground handler they want to 
choose. CAAS will not intervene and suggest to the LCCs which ground handler is 
more suitable for them. It believes in letting market forces play the role of influencing 
the choices made by the carriers.  
Several ground observations of the airport show that, more often than not, 
LCCs using Terminal One of the airport tend to have their aircraft parked at the 
extreme ends of the terminal, thereby resulting in passengers having to walk great 
distances to get to the boarding gates. When queried on this matter, Mr Fong said that 
there are no specific gates set aside for LCCs. The reason behind my observations is 
that the gates at the extreme ends of the terminal are catered to the smaller aircrafts 
which coincidentally are used by the majority of the LCCs. 
 
5.6 Chapter summary 
 This chapter has presented some of the key empirical findings from my 
research. In essence, the author has used mapping as a tool to highlight the changing 
spatial networks of the LCCs flying to and from Singapore. Through mapping out the 
routes, we can also see how connected Singapore is to the rest of the region by the 
LCCs. The author has also provided, using real world data, a comparison of flight 
frequencies, volumes and schedules to highlight the connectivity of Singapore to 
regional destinations. Last but not least, physical examinations of the airports were 
done to highlight the differences in airport spatial planning for the LCCs between that 
of Singapore and the selected regional airports. These observations were 
supplemented by qualitative interviews with academics and experts in the field. 
Throughout the discussion, the author has situated the findings into the wider 




geopolitical environment, assessing the role of the state, the aviation authorities and 
the ASAs in creating a conducive environment for the growth of LCCs. Only upon 



























CHAPTER SIX: EVALUATION OF BUSINESS MODEL FOR LOW COST 




 The aim of this chapter is to compare passengers’ selection criteria for a low 
cost carrier (LCC) flying the Singapore – Bangkok sector, so as to determine the most 
preferred business model for a LCC operating in the Southeast Asian region, and 
especially for Singapore. It is important to understand the factors that drive travellers 
in their selection of a LCC so as to achieve growth in this market. Currently, the 
business models adopted by the LCCs operating on the Singapore – Bangkok sector 
differ and, beyond this route, there are several business models for airline operations 
out there in the market. It will therefore be useful to know which business model is 
preferred by passengers in this region. 
 This chapter begins by providing an explanation on why the Singapore – 
Bangkok sector was chosen for the surveys conducted with travellers. An examination 
of the business model used by the LCCs serving the Singapore – Bangkok sector is 
then analysed briefly. The paper then concentrates primarily on the surveys 
conducted, including the methodology used and the key findings. Finally, the chapter 
will be concluded with an analysis of the findings, highlighting the ideal scenario for 
passengers flying on LCCs in this region. 
 
6.2  Background on the business models of the low cost carriers 
 As mentioned throughout this thesis, it is almost impossible to ignore the 
growth of LCCs in this region and in Singapore. To put things in perspective, within a 
span of a year in 2005, four LCCs started operations to and from Singapore, all of 
which ply the Singapore – Bangkok sector. In the following sub-sections, the author 
will provide a brief description of the four LCCs, with focus on their operations 




pertaining to the Singapore-Bangkok sector. The focus will be on their business 
models, given that a description of their growth and development has already been 
mentioned in Chapter Three. 
 
6.2.1 Air Asia (Thai Air Asia) 
 Air Asia was initially a loss-making operator on Malaysia’s domestic sectors. 
However, after it was restructured as an entrepreneurial LCC by its new owners, it led 
a new wave of aggressive competitors and became a profitable LCC shortly after the 
restructuring. It was also the first airline in the world to introduce Short Message 
System (SMS) booking. Equipped with a strong low cost formula, Air Asia began to 
move into intra-Asian markets in 2004 (O’Connell and Williams, 2005). Its ambition 
to operate a pan-Asian carrier took a major step forward with the formation of a joint 
venture with Shin Corporation Plc of Thailand. This joint venture resulted in the 
formation of a franchise, under the brand name Thai Air Asia (Hooper, 2005). In 
April 2004, Thai Air Asia became the first LCC to ply the Singapore – Bangkok 
sector (CAAS, 2004).  
 
6.2.2 ValuAir 
 Valuair operated its maiden flight on the Singapore – Bangkok sector in May 
2004, shortly after Thai Air Asia introduced the same routing. The company’s 
business model is different from that of Thai Air Asia, in that it believes in the notion 
that customers do expect some basic levels of comfort and service. The airline does 
not pride itself on extreme low costs but instead on the level of service it can offer 
despite not being a full service airline. It aimed to cater to the entrepreneurs of small 
and medium-size companies who want to have some basic frills but who are not 




willing to pay the cost on full service carriers (Asia Times Online, 2004). The airline 
has since been bought up by Jetstar Asia’s parent company Jetstar and its name is 
currently retained to serve the Indonesian market as Indonesia refuses to give Jetstar 
Asia’s the required landing rights for lucrative markets such as Jakarta, Surabaya and 
Denpasar. 
 
6.2.3 Tiger Airways 
 Tiger Airways started its maiden voyage to Bangkok in August 2005. This 
immediately pitted it against the incumbent LCCs flying the same sector, that is, Thai 
Air Asia and Valuair. The airline has multiple fare tiers and a no-frills service with no 
meals and no seat allocations (Tiger Airways, 2006), similar to the model operated by 
Thai Air Asia. The airline aims to be the lowest cost carrier in Southeast Asia and 
claims to have a business plan that will see it dominate the region (Hooper, 2005). 
Since its inauguration, the airline has been competing on price, with various 
promotions from time to time, sometimes with airfares going as low as S$0.88 per 
way (Tiger Airways, 2004, 2005, 2006). This strategy seems to work for the airline as 
business grew quickly and fleet expansion was rapid likewise. In November 2006, the 
airline has even won the Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation ‘Low Cost Airline of the 
Year’ award (Centre for Asia Pacific Aviation, 2006). 
 
6.2.4 Jetstar Asia 
 Qantas Airways added to the competition based in Singapore when it 
announced in April 2004 that it had become the largest shareholder in a joint venture 
to operate a LCC, named Jetstar Asia. The airlines’ maiden flight was also on the 
Singapore – Bangkok sector. As for the business model it is using, Jetstar Asia is 




using one that is in between the ultimate low cost strategy utilized by Thai Air Asia 
and Tiger Airways and the basic frills strategy used by Valuair. Jetstar Asia does 
provide some basic frills like allocated seating but it does not provide in-flight meals 
nor a wider seat pitch like what Valuair had offered. 
 
6.3 Methodology 
 The research method used for this chapter is similar to the study by Mason 
(2000) for his research on the propensity of business travellers to use low cost 
airlines. The author evaluated the value of a number of product elements in monetary 
terms by forcing the sample size of travellers to trade product benefits against travel 
expenditure (Appendix). A Stated Preference methodology was used and in the words 
of Mason (2000), the technique “allows respondents to trade off one variable against 
another, because the market is in change and looking at past behaviour may not be a 
good indicator of future behaviour”. Open-ended questions were also included in the 
Stated Preference survey form so as to provide the qualitative balance to the research. 
Qualitative methods, not of positivist tradition, are essential and employed so as to 
capitalize on its value of “having the distinct advantage of being able to measure 
opinions and similar intangible attributes, which cannot be observed visually and must 
be expressed verbally by individuals possessing these attributes” (Stoddard, 
1982:159).  
 Respondents were selected based on the simple random sampling technique. 
Individuals from all walks of life and all age groups were selected. Due to the 
restricted timing given for this research project, the target was to achieve at least 150 
responses. This target, however, was not achieved. Nevertheless, 100 respondents 
participated in the survey and all the questionnaires which they filled up were 




analysed and deemed usable. Before conducting the questionnaire survey, a pilot test 
was conducted that required five randomly selected people to complete the form.  
 There are certain limitations to the method used, such as the generalisation to 
the broader population but given the timeframe and nature of the study, this is 
understandable. Another major difficulty faced during the data collection was the 
difficulty in getting respondents for the survey. Many people gave a nonchalant 
attitude towards the author’s request for them to take part in the survey. Networking is 
essential and critical and the author is glad that some friends and colleagues help out 
by getting respondents for him.  
 
6.4 Results and analysis 
6.4.1  Responses 
 Table 6.1 indicates the average price respondents were willing to pay for the 
additional frills on flights operated by LCCs. The average prices were derived by 
calculating the mean price stated by the 80 respondents for each top-up category as 
listed on the survey questionnaire. The base price was derived from the non-
discounted fare listed on Tiger Airways, which is a no-frills LCC operating on the 
Singapore – Bangkok sector, for the month of November 2006. An important point to 
note is that the prices given by respondents in this table were meant for a general LCC 
flying the Singapore – Bangkok sector and not for the LCC which they have taken. 
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S$35 S$39 S$45 S$55 
  




Based on the survey results as shown in Table 6.1, the average increase in 
price willing to be paid by respondents for the inclusion of an aerobridge for use by 
passengers taking a LCC is marginal, at only S$2. For the inclusion of an aerobridge, 
designated seating and an increase of one inch of the seat pitch, passengers were 
willing to top up an addition of S$6 from the base price given. If a simple meal was 
added to all the stated frills so far, respondents are willing to top-up an addition of 
S$12 and if inter-lining is included, they were prepared to top-up an addition of S$22.  
 
 




6.4.2 Categorisations and business models 
The first three categories of the top-up list actually reflect the business models 
used by the LCCs currently operating in Singapore as well as the rest of the world. 
Essentially, top-up 1 reflects the model used by Thai Air Asia for the Singapore – 
Bangkok sector, whereby the only frill provided by the airline is that it uses Terminal 
One in Changi Airport for passengers to embark and disembark. By using Terminal 
One as a parking ground, passengers can board and get off the plane using an 
aerobridge. Tiger Airways, on the other hand, uses the Budget Terminal, which means 
passengers have to use the aircraft steps to get on and off the plane. Top-up 2 reflects 
the model used by Jetstar Asia, in which there are two additional frills – seat 
allocation and increased seat pitch. Jetstar Asia’s business philosophy is that when 
seats are assigned, passengers will not need to jostle for their seats and can be assured 
of a hassle-flight (Jetstar Asia website, 2006). The company also believes that the one 
inch of extra width between the seat in front and behind will provide additional space 
and comfort.  
Top-up 3 reflects the model used by Valuair, which is now managed by the 
Jetstar group. Valuair had wanted to place itself somewhere in between a full-frills 
airline and a no-frills airline. Their target customers were the businessmen from the 
small and medium enterprises (SMEs) and therefore the frills they offer on their 
flights reflect this aim. Top-up 4 is a proposed business model which has yet to be 
implemented by any LCC. The main reason behind the non-utilisation of such a 
model is that LCCs believe in flying from point-to-point instead of using the hub-and-
spoke network of flight scheduling. As such, most of the flight timings are not 
synchronized to allow for passengers to transit through an airport on a single ticket. 
Synchronising flight timings can be troublesome and cost-ineffective. Since most 




LCCs want to offer the lowest price possible air tickets to their customers, interlining 
is not a top priority for them. Most LCCs have also emphasized that they will not be 
responsible if passengers fail to make their connections, even if their onward journey 
is with the same carrier (O’Connell and Williams, 2005).  
Recently, however, Jetstar Asia has started synchronizing selected flight 
timings and aim to provide passengers with a seamless transfer through Changi 
Airport. However, it is important to note that although interlining is now provided, it 
is only available for certain flight sectors operated by the carrier itself and no 
synchronising is made jointly with other carriers and/or partners. Also, no meals are 
provided on board. Therefore the situation is still not one which is akin to the 
Category 4 of the top-ups listed in Table 6.1. 
 
6.4.3 The importance of selected frills 
According to the results, it can be determined that respondents value frills 
such as wider seat pitch and in-flight meals more than frills like having an aerobridge 
for passengers to embark and disembark, as reflected in the additional costs they are 
willing to pay. In the open-ended question and answer section of the survey, almost 
30% of the respondents have also indicated ‘seat pitch’ to be the most important frill 
to them (Table 6.2). 
 
Frills Passengers who think the frill is the most 
important 
Aerobridge 8% 
Seat Allocation 21% 




Table 6.2: Most important frill to a passenger flying a LCC 
(Source: Author) 




In general, the results are similar to the results achieved by Mason (2000), 
Fourie and Lubbe (2006) as well as industry surveys (CIC Research, 2003; 
International Air Transport Association, 2004) in terms of seat comfort (allocation 
and pitch). One respondent highlighted the importance of seat pitch saying that he did 
not like the feeling of not being able to stretch his legs properly on a LCC aircraft 
which has narrow seats. Another mentioned that “seats are really uncomfortable in the 
budget airlines. I am willing to pay more for more comfortable seating even if it is 
just one degree more”.   
However, the high importance placed on in-flight meals and interlining differ 
from other surveys on passengers’ perceptions on flying a LCC (see, for example, 
O’Connell and Williams, 2005; Fourie and Lubbe, 2006), which could possibly 
indicate a difference in perception of low cost flying by travellers from Singapore. 
The reason could also be due to the way in which the respondents were structured 
and/or sampled for this particular study. Over 70% of the respondents were working 
adults, which could possibly explain why they were willing to pay more for added-
frills such as in-flight meals and inter-lining. In the case if most of the respondents 
were non-working adults or students, it is likely that inter-lining will be of little 
concern and the respondents would not have been willing to pay much more for such 
a frill.  
An interesting observation is that most respondents seemed not be willing to 
pay much more for an added frill such as an aerobridge. Several respondents had 
indicated that an aerobridge is not a necessary frill because even if one is flying on a 
full frills carrier, there are also chances that a passenger may be asked to embark or 
disembark from a plane using the aircraft steps because the aerobridges in a particular 
airport have been used up during the peak hours or simply because the airport does 




not have any aerobridge. This is especially so for some of the regional airports. It is 
also to be noted that about 80% of the respondents were below the age of 40, which 
may explain why aerobridge was not a ‘critical’ frill in their opinion. If most of the 
respondents were above the age of 40, and especially if they were above 60, chances 
would be that aerobridge would become a much-valued frill, such that they would be 
willing to pay a lot more, so that they would not have to endure the climbing up and 
down of aircraft steps, which can be a chore for the elderly. 
 
6.4.4 Reality strikes: the need to operate cost-effectively 
While it seems that the respondents were willing to pay much more for frills 
such as in-flight meals and interlining services, the price that they were willing to pay 
may still not be enough for an LCC to operate cost-effectively and realistically. The 
average price for the last category of the top-up (Table 6.1) is at S$55. If we take into 
account that the return journey for the same flight sector is included and that the price 
a respondent is willing to pay remains the same, it would mean that the total cost the 
respondent would be paying for the return-ticket on a LCC providing the frills stated 
would be S$110. This price is 22% lower than what a full-frills airline providing 
similar frills would charge. A check on the airfares charged by full-frills carriers for 
the same flight sectors indicated that the lowest discounted airfare is at S$140 (return-
ticket) on Garuda Indonesia (Misa Travel website, 2006). Garuda Indonesia’s 
economy class provides frills which are similar to what have been listed in Category 4 
of the ‘frills top-up’ chart. As such, the price of S$110 might not be enough to cover 
for all the frills listed and might render the LCC to be burdened by high operating 
costs. This will also explain why a low price competitor cannot normally afford to 
offer service features that substantially add to its cost base or take from its operational 




efficiency (Lawton and Solomko, 2005). Straddling or trying to provide what a full-
frills competitor has to offer can result in a LCC failing to be cost-efficient and price 
competitive, rendering it vulnerable to market forces and customer demand (Porter, 
1996; Lawton, 1999). 
The discussion above on remaining cost-effective and price competitive 
highlighted an important issue, which is, a LCC will find it difficult to compete with a 
full service airline even if customers are willing to pay more for certain additional 
frills on a LCC flight. Having said so, although respondents for the survey had 
indicated their willingness to pay more for frills such as having interlining services for 
a LCC, such a business model will most likely not be very operationally and cost-
effective for a LCC to follow. Unless passengers are willing to foot a higher price 
than the average of S$110 derived from the survey, LCCs should not attempt to take 
up this model. Likewise, the business model based on top-ups as shown in Category 3 
may not be suitable for LCCs to take up. The average return fare a respondent is 
willing to pay is calculated to be at only S$90, which again may not be enough for a 
LCC to operate cost-efficiently. In actual fact, this business model has proven to be 
ineffective for the LCC market in Singapore, as can be seen in the failure of Valuair 
which based its operation on such a model.  
Even if passengers are willing to fork out more money to pay for frills on 
LCCs, they will realise that this is something which is not realistic in the long run. If 
passengers must pay more for the frills so that the LCCs can operate cost-effectively, 
they may as well spend the money on the full service carriers, in which many have 
already brought down their ticket prices substantially to compete with the LCCs.   
 
 




6.5 The most preferred business model for LCCs 
 With the third and fourth category of the top-ups being unrealistic business 
models for LCCs serving the Singapore market, it boils down to the business models 
used by the current operators, that is, the completely no-frills model used by Tiger 
Airways; the almost no-frills model used by Thai Air Asia and the model which 
includes selected frills such as seat allocation and increased seat pitch, which is used 
by Jetstar Asia. Looking at the open-ended question and answer section of the survey 
questionnaire, it is suggested that the business model used by Jetstar Asia seems to be 
the most preferred business model by many travellers. While the support for having a 
wider seat pitch has been explained, respondents had also gave a strong indication that 
seat allocation is an important frill which they would not mind paying a few dollars 
more. One respondent felt that by having seats allocated to passengers, it gave better 
control to passenger flows and prevents major congestions during the boarding stage. 
He felt that the boarding stage was the most frustrating and tedious procedure of the 
flight when he was flying a LCC which did not allocate seats to passengers. Many 
other respondents also felt that if seats were allocated, there would be no need for the 
rush for “good seats” and this would also indirectly allow passengers more time to do 
some shopping inside the terminals, which could help to add to the revenue of the 
airport.  
 In a recent Skytrax Airline of the Year survey, Jetstar Asia was voted the Best 
Low Cost Airline 2006 for both the Asia and Southeast Asia categories. The Airline 
of the Year survey is a worldwide independent passenger study conducted at airports 
by Skytrax. The Skytrax worldwide survey interviews totaled over 13 million, with 
more than 93 different nationalities (Skytrax website, 2006). On winning the award, 
Ms Chong Pit Lian, CEO Jetstar Asia, expressed that the company was happy and 




encouraged by the award and that recognition by their passengers and customers 
worldwide was important to them as it showed that they were doing the right things 
(Jetstar Asia website, 2006).  
 The award received by Jetstar Asia ties in well with the survey carried out for 
this research. It shows that LCCs operating in this region cannot operate on a business 
model which is solely based on cost and pricing. This is not to say it is impossible to 
gain the market share based entirely on low cost fares but it will necessitate rigorous 
and unrelenting cost efficiency on the part of emergent Asian LCCs (Lawton and 
Solomko, 2005). When carriers do not emerge as the price leaders in their markets, 
they will have to differentiate to survive and grow.  
 Despite the fact that Thai Air Asia and its parent company, Air Asia, is aware 
of the challenge and is trying to position itself in this market space by acknowledging 
the difficulty of competing only on price (Lawton and Solomko, 2005), the airline is 
not doing enough to switch to a business model akin to the one used by Jetstar. 
Currently, the planes operated by Thai Air Asia are still the old Boeing B-737-300s 
which comes with narrow seat pitch, and seat allocation is still non-existent on all its 
flights (AirAsia website, 2006); although, in recent months, the airline has brought in 
new Airbus A-320s to renew its fleet. Tiger Airways, the rapidly growing competitor 
in the LCC market, still has the belief that low cost is the way to go to capture the 
market. Nevertheless, it has sort of “gave in” to market demand and has introduced 
allocated seating, but this comes with a cost. For a long period of time, it was also the 
only LCC operating to and from Singapore which did not use printed boarding passes. 
All the boarding passes were handwritten and this reflected the company’s 
determination to cut down on overhead costs to pass on the savings to customers. Yet 
again, in recent months, the airline has introduced printed boarding passes. Once 




again, the airline has probably realised that going completely no-frills may not be the 
feasible solution and winning strategy.  
Whether or not the ultimate no-frills business model used by Tiger Airways, 
which is a replica of famous LCCs elsewhere, such as easyjet and Southwest Airlines, 
can propel its continued growth remains to be seen. The recent award Jetstar Asia 
received and this survey seem to suggest that the airline may not do well in the long 
run if it continues to use such a business model. 
 
6.6 Travel experience and business model 
 Leveraging on good service may work for LCCs if they want to capture the 
low cost flying market and maximise profits. At the beginning of this chapter, it was 
mentioned that Table 6.1 was derived based on based on respondents’ inputs for a 
general LCC flight operating from Singapore to Bangkok and not for the specific 
LCC which they have taken for the same sector. Respondents were also requested to 
fill in a separate chart on the prices they were willing for the LCC which they had 
taken before on the same sector. The reason for doing so is to check if the travel 
experience on a particular LCC can affect the willingness to pay for frills on that 
carrier vis-à-vis on a general LCC (Appendix 1).  
 It was found that for passengers who had taken Jetstar Asia for the Singapore 
– Bangkok sector, they have indicated slightly higher prices that they were willing to 
pay for the topping-up of frills for the airline than for a general LCC. In contrast, 
those who had taken Thai Air Asia and Tiger Airways generally indicated the same or 
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$34 $38 $42 $50 
 
Table 6.5: Average price passengers are willing to pay for Tiger Airways flights on 
the Singapore-Bangkok sector 
(Source: Author) 
 
A number of passengers who had flown on Jetstar Asia for the flight sector 
have expressed that they were willing to pay an even higher price for the topping-up 
of frills if they were onboard Jetstar Asia’s flights because the airline had given them 
an impression that they were concerned over customers’ welfare.  
 As seen from the above discussion, it is quite clear that prior travel experience 
can affect the willingness to pay for additional frills on a particular LCC vis-à-vis a 
general LCC. Even if Thai Air Asia or Tiger Airways were to switch their business 
models to one which is similar to Jetstar Asia’s, they may not be able to capture the 




market, at least in the short run. The ability to choose a business model that is 
preferred by travelers right from the start now seems to be a crucial factor in 
determining the success of a LCC, but the question is, whether a LCC is able to 
ascertain the most advantageous business model right from the beginning. Perhaps, 
new entrants to the LCC market, especially in new or potential LCC markets such as 
Southwest Asia, may need to carry out pilot surveys to find out how potential LCC 
passengers perceive travelling on a LCC. 
 
6.7 Chapter summary 
 This chapter has shed some light on the issue of which business model appears 
to be the most preferred by travelers, for LCCs operating in the Singapore context. 
While the survey and research have indicated that the business model adopted by 
Jetstar Asia appears to be the most preferred by travellers from Singapore, it does not 
discount the notion that ultimately low fare is the deciding factor in decisions to go or 
stay home for budget-conscious travellers. In the words of Reinnoldt, cited in Neuman 
(2004), the results shown here suggest that there is a ‘transformational shift in the way 
people travel in Asia’. There are an increasing number of people who fly on LCCs but 
who are not price-conscious all the time. They demand certain frills and are willing to 
pay for these extra frills on the LCCs. It is therefore the prerogative of the LCCs to 
look into this market and adopt a suitable business model to serve this group of 
travellers.  
 It must also be noted that there are limitations inherent in convenience 
sampling and the relative small sampling frame must be taken into account when 
viewing the results since they cannot be generalized to all travellers using the LCCs – 
at best they suggest certain trends. Also to be noted are other issues which can affect 




the choice of a suitable business model for a LCC such as the limited bilateral 
agreements that allow LCCs to fly between countries and too few satellite airports 
that LCCs need to keep costs low (Lawton and Solomko, 2005). This is especially so 
in the region. Demographics is also an issue to be taken into account (Arnold, 2004).  
 To conclude, the results shown in this chapter has indicated that the ideal 
scenario for passengers flying on LCCs would be to have a combination of low fares 
and some of the products offered by full service airlines. It would seem therefore that 
passengers would like to see the business model currently used by Jetstar Asia to be 
one that will be followed through by other LCCs operating from Singapore and 
perhaps in the region. Bearing in mind that the airline industry is constantly on the 
change, this desire by passengers may also change within a short period of time and it 
is the choice of LCCs to always carry out surveys with passengers and potential 





























CHAPTER SEVEN: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Summary 
The primary aim of this thesis is to look at the impacts of LCCs on Singapore, 
with comparison to selected cities in Southeast and Far East Asia. The author has 
done so through a variety of means, by first discussing some of the theoretical aspects 
of LCC developments and operations which is essential knowledge for anyone 
interested in the topic of LCC. A highlight of the differences between FSCs and LCCs 
has also been given to help readers better understand the differences between the two. 
The LCC development movement in North America, Europe and Asia were briefly 
explained to showcase the similarities as well as differences in their developmental 
trajectories. This regional approach which is being adopted also shows the distinct 
geographical and economic characteristics of the region which make it unique and a 
worthwhile study site. For the purpose of this research, there was also an attempt to 
show the relationship between geography, air transport development and LCC growth. 
This will inevitably help readers to understand the contributions the discipline can 
make to the area of transportation studies.  
Existing works on LCCs were looked at and critique upon; and there was an 
emphasis on the notion of hub and how it relates to LCCs as well as how regulations 
within the air transport sector affect the growth of LCCs. Such issues are important 
from an academic perspective as it shows the dynamism and evolving nature of the 
industry.  
Before the author went into measuring the impacts of the LCCs, he had also 
attempted to highlight the development of some of the carriers in the region as well as 
how the airports are reacting and coping with the rise of these airlines. With the 
background knowledge, it will certainly help the readers in enhancing their 




knowledge of the LCC industry as a whole and more importantly, to be able to use 
these information to do a proper comparative analysis with the development of LCCs 
here in Singapore.  
A series of spatial and temporal measures were used to evaluate the growth of 
the LCCs in the region as well as Singapore and these ranged from spatial mapping to 
network analysis to flight schedule comparisons. The spatial mapping and network 
analysis were meant to highlight the connectedness of Singapore to the region by help 
of the LCCs whereas an analysis of the flight schedules will aid in the understanding 
of Singapore’s connectivity with the region by the LCCs. The connectedness and 
connectivity of Singapore with the region were also analysed in relation to the tourism 
arrival figures to give a better understanding of the LCC industry not just within the 
transport sector itself but within a larger overarching economic sphere. 
Aside from the empirical analysis of data on the LCCs, a physical examination 
of the airports in the region was carried out to better visualise the ground spatial 
changes at the airports which could have been caused by the influx of LCCs. By 
encompassing the changes at other airports in the region, there can be more effective 
and meaningful comparison with that of what is happening at our home turf, 
Singapore Changi Airport.  
Finally, the author had chosen to depart from conventional forms of transport 
analysis by adopting a case-study approach to tie together many of the seemingly 
disparate issues and trends discussed in the earlier chapters. The case study was an 
evaluation of the business model for LCCs. This was done by analysing the Singapore 
– Bangkok sector, which is the most popular sector amongst all the LCCs which serve 
Singapore. There are several business models adopted by LCCs around the world and 
it will be useful to know which is the one favoured by passengers on one of the most 




lucrative routes in the region. It is important to understand the factors that drive 
travellers in their selection of a LCC so as to achieve growth in this market and 
therefore, the case study will be useful for sustainable growth of the LCC industry, 
especially in the context of Singapore. The case study is very much based on the 
passengers’ perspective because they too play a key role in the air transport arena 
being the dominant consumers of air transport. The results of a passenger survey were 
presented and various generalizations can be made about factors which affect their 
choice of the LCC as well as their attitudes towards the selected LCCs.  
 
7.2 Implications of study and future research 
The air transport industry is a dynamic industry in nature and this means that 
the data that have presented here today may become obsolete in a very short period of 
time. However, it is not the author’s intention to write an encyclopedia or a doctrine 
which is to be memorised by heart. It is hoped that anyone reading this thesis will 
gain an understanding of what the LCC industry is like in Singapore as well as the 
region, with focus on the impacts of such a phenomenon. An appreciation of how the 
whole LCC phenomena came about, how it works, and how it impacts on our 
economy will allow passengers to make more informed decisions when they embark 
on their next trip on a LCC as well as how their support for a LCC can bring about 
bigger repercussions on the economy. Ideally, it is hoped that more can be done to 
move this field out of its academic insularity to a wider audience. 
An understanding of the market is quintessential towards ensuring healthy 
revenue margins for both airport and airline operators. With competing airports hot on 
their heels, airports aiming to become a hub in the industry should look into the 
potentials of LCCs helping to bring in that extra income as well as boosting the 




airport’s overall hub effect. On the other hand, LCCs must understand the needs of 
their customers, especially the modern-day travellers, so as to be able to achieve 
sustainable growth. The author has shown through this research that passengers do 
take into consideration their previous experiences with a particular LCC when they 
decide whether or not it is worth paying extra money to that particular LCC should it 
come up with an upgrading plan for their in-flight services.  
The growth of the LCC industry in Singapore as well as the region has 
appeared to be healthy, judging from the statistics as presented in the previous 
chapters. Thus, airports should continue to strive towards attracting LCCs to call at 
them. However, with tight regulatory frameworks still existing in the region, the 
growth of LCCs will likely be restricted at least in the short run. The fact that LCCs 
have not been able to take advantage on the fifth freedom right which many FSCs 
enjoy shows that there is a need to further deregulate the air transport industry in this 
part of the world to enhance the development of the LCCs which can in turn boost the 
overall air transport industry. There is definitely great potential for further research in 
this respect, given that the demand of LCCs is likely to increase over the next few 
years as the propensity to travel increases with rising living standards across most 
parts of Asia. The good news is that it seems just a matter of time, given the sweeping 
global wave of deregulation in aviation that the regional economies will have little 
choice but to allow their national carriers to stand on their own feet and welcome all 
the airlines including LCCs, or risk their cities and economies becoming isolated from 
the global network.  
 As mentioned earlier, things are changing very fast in the air transport industry 
and as the author is writing this thesis, new developments are taking place within the 
LCC sector. For instance, Indonesia Air Asia is set to make its maiden flight to 




Singapore after years of “antagonism” between the Indonesian aviation authority and 
that of CAAS. The story behind the antagonism has been explained earlier on in this 
thesis. Also, Tiger Airways will be setting up yet another secondary hub in Incheon of 
the Republic of South Korea, aside from the one in Melbourne, Australia. How will 
this impact on the primary hub of the airline, that is, Singapore? At the ground level, 
the Ministry of Transport has also expressed its intention to expand the Budget 
Terminal in anticipation of the growing LCC traffic. CAAS stated that “After almost 
two years of operations, the terminal's expansion is necessary to keep ahead of the air 
traffic growth” (Asiaone website, 06 March 2008). The expansion project will start in 
July and is expected to be completed in early 2009. The question here is: how 
sustainable will this be?  
 Another interesting development, not pertaining specifically to LCCs is the 
launching of the A380 service by Singapore Airlines. While orders for the A380 have 
come from FSCs, there is every possibility that LCCs can also purchase such an 
aircraft given that it is one of the most economical aircraft to be manufactured to date 
on a per seat-mile basis. The A380, when configured to an all-economy class setting 
can actually seat as many as 853 passengers, making it a very cost-efficient aircraft 
for LCCs planning to serve high capacity long-haul routes. Three LCCs in the region 
have already ventured into long-haul services, although one has failed (as in the case 
of Oasis Hong Kong Airlines). It remains to be seen whether the Singapore-based 
LCCs will be keen to start long-haul services and whether the A380s can come in 
useful for these airlines. 
 All these questions actually boil down to one thing - the role of geography and 
its importance in providing the big picture perspective; gathering and piecing together 
different disciplinary viewpoints and methods in a holistic way. Air transport is 




intrinsically geographical and if development patterns and trends in contemporary air 
transport is analysed spatially, it will allow for the researcher to posit the information 
at different scales for varying stages of analysis. Even simple geographical tools such 
as the map can help to explain regional trends. While air transport has been treated 
mostly using either economics or business management approaches, the very nature of 
it lies in spatial interaction. Therefore, a geographical insight is valuable when 
examining these phenomena. 
 
7.3 Concluding comments 
Commercial aviation has come a long way since it first started in this part of 
the world and today the region has seen the rise of the LCC industry and is home to 
some 30 fledging LCCs. While some of the LCCs are developing at a rapid pace, the 
author would think that the LCC industry in the region is still at a fairly early 
developmental stage as there exists abundant avenues for growth, but such growth can 
only be facilitated by a more liberal aviation environment. Thankfully, ASEAN 
realises the importance of this matter and in a statement issued by CAAS, its Director-
General and Chief Executive Officer, Mr Lim Kim Choon, said: “With increased air 
transport liberalisation in this region, airlines, including low cost carriers, have now 
greater opportunities to rapidly expand their air network and increase their flight 
operations” (Asiaone website, 6 March 2008).  
All the literature that the author has come across in the process of writing this 
thesis have pointed to the immense potential for LCC growth in the region, barring 
any more catastrophes, both natural or human-induced, such as the 911 incident and 
the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) episode. While air transport industry 
is certainly one of the more volatile industries, the future certainly looks bright for the 




LCCs, especially for those based in Southeast and Far East Asia. In the research field, 
the author strongly believes that research opportunities will continue to emerge given 
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Airline flown for Singapore (SIN) – Bangkok (BKK) sector: Jetstar Asia / Thai Air 




Please indicate the price you are willing to pay for the respective top-up of frills in the 
low cost carriers for the SIN-BKK sector (one-way) (Note: This part is not for the 
low cost carrier that you have flown with.). State the amount in Singapore Dollars and 




















Yes.  Yes.  Yes.  


































































Please indicate the price you are willing to pay for the top-up of frills in the low cost 
carrier you have flown for the SIN-BKK sector. State the amount in Singapore 
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Part 3 
(a) Which of the frills listed in the tables do you consider to be the most important and 




(b) Do you think that if a passenger chooses to fly a low-cost carrier, he/she should 




(c) If the prices you have listed in Part 2 differ from those you have listed in Part 1, 




End of survey questionnaire. Thank you for taking part in the survey. ☺ 
